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The collapse of the Common Market talks in Brussels
in January, 1963, signaled the beginning of a new era in re-
lationships among the Atlantic partners of the NATO alliance.
The nature of the alliance had changed since its formation
in 1949; and France, the leader of the "new" Europe, demanded
a larger role in policy formulation and direction.
This thesis explores the evolution of de Gaulle*
s
goals for France in Europe and vis-£-vis the Atlantic alli-
ance* The relationship of these goals shows that the
Atlantic policies of de Gaulle cannot be divorced from his
European policies.
If NATO is to continue as an effective force, it must
have France as a member. The price of French participation
is a remodeled NATO. It may not be feasible to meet all
French objections with changes, but, in the light of current
realities, NATO is long over due for a reorganization.
-•
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With the collapse of the Common Market talks in
January, 1963, in Brussels, almost everyone in Great Britain
and the United States experienced a reaction that was more
emotional than objective* The brutal and arbitrary manner
in which Great Britain was denied a place in Europe made it
apparent that for France, Britain's entry at that time (or
indeed within the near foreseeable future) was not part of
the de Gaulle view of the developing "new" Europe* The
press conference of President de Gaulle on January 14, 1963,
did more than just block Great Britain's entry into the
Common Market and Europe. It was also the most direct and
serious challenge to the Atlantic alliance and the Anglo-
American relationship in NATO since the creation of the
Fifth Republic* The slamming of the door to Great Britain
was, in de Gaulle's view, a summary denial of the expansion
and extension to the European Communities of American influ-
ence and hegemony*
In the period immediately following the French veto,
many explanations were advanced to account for the actions
of de Gaulle* To some, they were easily explained by the
dislike of the "Anglo-Saxons" by the General, by his feeling
of wounded pride at his shabby treatment by these powers







VOthers more accurately attributed his motives to no such
base considerations but rather to his realistic evaluation
of the political, military, and economic realities of the
situation which confronted France and Europe. Oe Gaulle
acted in a manner he believed was best for French interests,
European interests, and in the long run, the best interests
of the British* By his January maneuver and labeling of
Great Britain as "riot being European," he sought to drive a
wedge in the special relationship that exists between the
United States and Great Britain, and which finds its
greatest expression in the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
tion, Great Britain had to choose whether she preferred to
maintain her relationship with the United States or come
into Europe at the price of severing this umbilical tie*
The machinations of President de Gaulle raised many
questions concerning the NATO alliance and its probable
future* The more important questions concerned themselves
with the goal which de Gaulle is seeking to attain for France
in Europe and vls-A-vis the rest of the world* From this
follows the next and more important question, with which
this paper will be most concerned: how will this future
role de Gaulle envisions France playing affect the NATO
alliance, France *s participation in the alliance, and to
what extent will the means used to attain this end impinge
upon the alliance/
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To keep the discussion as simple as possible and not
become too enmeshed in the various points of discussion
regarding the personality of the leading protagonist, Presi-
dent de Gaulle, this aspect of the study has been kept in
the background as much as possible. While there are many
fascinating and provocative features in the personality of
the French President, it is felt that any discussion here
would only be deleterious to the study and add little to
whatever merit the French case might have.
In trying to ascertain the exact nature of the goal
sought by de Gaulle for France in Europe, if indeed such a
thing has been formulated even in his mind, it seemed not
too illogical to examine what he has said and written in the
past on this subject. From his past actions, it seems that
what he says he "desires" for France is, in fact, what he
intends to see implemented. At this point, it should be
mentioned that of all de Gaulle's seeming faults and per-
sonality quirks, he is not noted for any real measure of
inconsistency or disparity between his stated objectives and
his efforts to achieve what he regards as France's "rightful"
position of power and grandeur in the world*
In addition to the works of Charles de Gaulle, great
emphasis was placed upon United States governmental publica-
tions, where available, to obtain a balanced view of the










These publication were also a great source of basic infor-
mation on the alliance and intra-allied relations
.
Supplementing these sources were many publications of
the NATO Information service, Paris and, of course, volumi-
nous books and periodicals listed under "Secondary Sources"
in the bibliography*
After reading the de Gaulle Memoirs and many of his
other works and speeches, it seems Incongruous just how
statesmen in the United States and the United Kingdom could
fail to recognize and understand the designs and motives of
the French President* Perhaps it was wishful thinking, when
his professions of intent were clearly set out years ago,
that he lacked the requisite means to achieve his ends*
Thus, he was disregarded save for the difficulty his intran-
sigent attitude caused* That his statements were not frivo-
lous and his power to implement them is real was clearly
seen in his rejection of the British at Brussels* If de
Gaulle did not believe he had the power to stop Great
Britain* s entry, he would never have attempted his move in
opposition to the other members of the European Economic
Community* If his power were only de jure, that given him
in the Rome Treaty's veto provision on new members, and not
de facto , embodied in the belief of many Europeans that his
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have been the intense, vociferous attacks made against
de Gaulle on a personal level*
Exploring the many constituent elements underlying
the Gaullist goals, their evolution, and interaction with
the Atlantic Alliance led to the division of this work into
six chapters* The first chapter explores the goals which
de Gaulle has in mind for France and how they have evolved
and presented themselves in French policy in the years after
World War II* The maturation process and refinement of these
Gaullist aims and their relation, specifically, to the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization after de Gaulle's recall in
1958, is treated in Chapter II* The relationship of de
Gaulle's European aims and their interrelation with his
"Atlantic" policy is covered in Chapter III*
The Gaullist aims and their conflict with United
States policy, specifically directed toward United States
NATO policy in the 1960 *s and later, is the theme of Chapter
IV* This chapter also covers the interaction between the
United States and her agreement with Great Britain at Nassau
and the collapse of the Common Market negotiations at
Brussels* The fifth chapter deals with the affects which
the Gaullist goals for France will have upon the NATO alli-
ance, which as a point of fact, to a certain extent have been
indicated in previous chapters out of necessity* The final






THE EVOLUTION OF THE GAULLIST GOAL POR FRANCE
France emerged from the Second World War beset by
weakness, fears, and even a sense of humiliation at having
been liberated, after her bitter and complete defeat in 1940,
by the coalition of the "Anglo-Saxons." She was, in 1944
and 1945, a distraught nation which, as had the other occu-
pied countries of Europe, been weakened by Nazi exploitation
and occupation, and the ravages of her liberation* Her
future prospects for participation in the postwar world and
in the councils of the Great Powers was an uncertain and
seemingly unanswerable question* It was difficult to visual-
ize France* s future role in this coming era and just how
much of a factor she would be in the developing new power
balance. Certainly there was great doubt, especially among
her allies, whether she would ever regain her former status
as a Great Power. Such thoughts, if present, however, never
were allowed to cloud the expressions of France's ultimate
wartime leader, who, in that period of travail made himself
into the living symbol of France, General Charles Andre
Joseph Marie de Gaulle. The basic tenets and policies of
this man are embodied in the phrase, D Gaulle is France."
Stanley F* Clark, The Man Who is France i The Story
9 % b»3&-X£rJll A9*d
2General de Gaulle is in his manner of action and per-
sonality an unusual man; even for a statesman he is a most
controversial figure* Volumes could be devoted to the vari-
gated aspects of his character, personality, and ability;
but this is not the place for such an evaluation* Suffice
it to note that the carefully-cultivated aura of "mystique
and aloofness with which he surrounds himself, are not
wholly incomprehensible if one but reads the writings of
this man and lends a little credence to what he says are his
values* In his book, The Edge of the Sword , a treatise on
war, de Gaulle observes that, "• • • there can be no pres-
2tige without mystery, for familiarity breeds contempt*
"
Thus, the "mystique" of de Gaulle is the same "mystique"
that he transfers to France in her search for prestige under
his tutelage*
On the subject of leaders, a category in which he un-
questionably belongs and about which he can speak with no
little authority, he is as direct in his evaluation*
Aloofness, character, and the personification of
greatness, these qualities it is that surround with
prestige those who are prepared to carry a burden
which is too heavy for lesser mortals. 3
of General Charles de Gaulle (New York: Dodd, Mead and
"cfompany, 1963), p* TJ3.
2Charles de Gaulle, The Edge of the Sword , trans.
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3While this may sound pompous to many Americans, it is none
the less a very real factor in the General *s beliefs.
There is one characteristic of General de Gaulle's
personality that stands out more clearly against the back-
ground of the Common Market talks which ended so dramatically
on January 14t* of this year; this is his consistency of
stated purpose and action* He has for years, quite vocifer-
ously, stated his visions for Prance and the role which he
seeks to attain for her.
I. THE EARLY PERIOD
In his wartime speeches, there is a continuum of
thought and feeling, sometimes expressed, sometimes only
hinted, but always present, that France was great and will
be great again for it is her destiny as the natural leader
of civilized peoples. The concepts of French unity, power,
and prestige run "like a red thread" through his speeches of
the 1940-1945 period. 4
The differences between de Gaulle and the Western
allies during World War II arose more or less over these
same sentiments. De Gaulle believed the American and
British leaders paid too little heed to the French desire to
4Donald C. McKay, The United states and France
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951), p. 253.
1it net el $1 1
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4be recognized and understood* The leader of the Free French,
however, demanded more recognition of the efforts and sacri-
fices of his forces, more than was warranted in the opinion
of the Western leaders. Against the iniquities he felt were
present within the Western alliance, de Gaulle, on occasion,
gave vent to his feelings. At such times, there was usually
present in his speeches a veiled allusion to the future role
which France was bound to play in the postwar era, by reason
of her destiny and her past historic position. The comments
he made in 1944 are not too dissimilar from those he was to
utter at a later period, in the 1950* s, regarding another
alliance, NATO. In his address in Algiers, March 18, 1944,
de Gaulle, lamented France's role in the present conduct of
world affairs by the Western Powers and stated:
The conditions in which the government is placed
do not permit it to have in relation to other great
powers, a hearing proportionate to its sacred obliga-
tions •
On this difficult question the government's policy
is to make Itself heard and understood, despite the
many obstacles, by bringing the greatest possible
cooperation to the common effort, and to maintain
entire reserve as to the position of France, in matters
which concern her where attempts are made to solve
problems without her. 5
Oe Gaulle continued, pointing out what was to him
Charles de Gaulle, Two Speeches by General Charles










5France's obvious and necessary role in the Europe of the
postwar years.
Europe exists, conscious of what she is worth to
mankind in the aggregate and certain of emerging from
the sea of her sufferings, of reappearing, wiser for
her trials and ready to undertake constructive work
of a material, intellectual and moral nature for the
reorganization of the world* This she is eminently
capable of doing. . • . Then the action, the influence,
in one word the value of France will become necessary
to Europe according to the dictates of history, geog-
raphy and plain common sense - for its guidance, for
the renewal of its relations with the rest of the
world. 6
Even at such an early date and at such a tumultuous
time in the course of world events, de Gaulle allowed him-
self to expand upon France's position in that Europe of the
future postwar period, made more civilized by French pres-
ence, power, and leadership.
But in order that the old Continent, once renovated,
may attain a balance that corresponds to modern con-
ditions, it would seem that certain groupings of na-
tions should be formed, without, of course, their
encroaching on the sovereignty of any of the states.
As regards France, we believe that a sort of Western
European grouping achieved with us, primarily on an
economic basis and as broadly as possible, would be
highly advantageous •
?
This "grouping" envisioned by de Gaulle would have
worked in close cooperation with the Asian and African
states (at the time, 1944, France expected to regain her
possessions in Southeast Asia and North Africa and retain








6pivotal point of this "grouping" about which he stated,
« • • the Channel, the Rhine, and the Mediterranean would
act as arteries, would constitute an important center in the
g
world organization of production, exchange and security »"
These "arteries" broadly bound France on the West, South,
and Northeast; and thus it would appear that what de Gaulle
meant when he referred to a "Western European grouping
achieved with us" was really to be interpreted as a Western
European grouping "under French leadership*"
These ideas, voiced in an era of uncertainty, have
been modified by the press of events and the passage of time,
but they still are, in the main, the expression of de
Gaulle's wish to restore France to a position of greatness
in a world that has two super-powers at swords point* To
de Gaulle, France's glory in its past lay in its humanizing
ability* Her greatness in building her Empire was measured
in terms of how well she was able to aid the development of
9the underdeveloped peoples*
The belief that de Gaulle sought to return France to
the position of power she allegedly possessed in the pre—
World War II period, does not appear to this writer to be a
supportable argument* The Gaullist concept of France and
8Ibid *, p* 21* [Italics added*]










7the greatness of her past, would not lead him to seek for
France a return to the time where she was not truly proud,
where she was more of a follower than a leader, and in which
she suffered from a false psychological sense of security
furnished by that folle de securite , the Maginot line. The
France that de Gaulle sought was more comparable to that of
France of the 1920 f s. Victorious over the Boche (but at what
a terrible cost to httr future in the loss of her manhood and
vitality), economically sound, and with supposedly the
strongest armed force on the continent, she was the greatest
power in Europe and one of the world's leading states* while
the facts of later years would belle the notion of this pic-
ture of France, the feeling at the time was one of strength
and this was what de Gaulle sought to recapture for his
France.
II, SECURITY AS A BASE FOR
FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY
Security has always played a very important part, if
not the most important part, in forming a base for French
foreign policy* It is as true today as it was in 1945 or in
1918. The great tradition of French foreign policy, as
Jules Cambon stated, "... cared only for France; it was
essentially conservative, circumspect, deliberate." The
Jules Cambon, "The Permanent Bases of French Foreign
--» ,-.- h -t !.s - " ':' •.
8traditional aims of France center about her search for secu-
rity, "and what is this but the maintenance of peace-
"
France v in the pursuit of her security, put her trust
in military power because of her open frontiers in the North
and East which were invitations to invasion* The military
power which she sought, M. Cambon points out, was not, how-
ever, that of the aggressive Napoleon with his grandiose
schemes for France. These wen*, beyond France's frontiers
and thus "broke through all the traditional limits of French
policy." 12
Security, M. Cambon emphasized, is much more than
keeping free the motherland or the overseas territories.
It also means the maintenance of the world's respect
for them, the maintenance of their economic interests,
everything, in a word, which goes to make up the gran-
deur, the life itself, of the nation* But all peoples
have not the same ideal) each follows what it con-
siders to be its national interests in accordance with
its own traditions. If nations are to live in peace,
those who direct the foreign affairs of each state must
try diligently and long to understand and respect the
aspirations of others. For by a statesman's comprehen-
sion of the factors which direct the destiny of nations
one measures the breadth and depth of his genius. 13
This last thought would seem to be especially valid
today as an evaluation of the needs of statesmen on both
Policy," The Foreign Affairs Reader (New York: Harper and
Brothers ,"1^47), p. lTT.
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sides of the Atlantic to understand each other's position
within the framework of our present associations} i.e., the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
In line with her search for security, France sought
to regain her former power and greatness* A precursor of
later efforts in this direction occurred during the early
phases of World War II when the French Committee-in-£xile
was established* Its first ex*. torts were directed toward
gaining recognition by the allies as the representative
voice of France and a full-scale ally so as to be able to
share in the decisions affecting the conduct of the war and
of the peace. .e Committee had two very basic demands
which it claimed in the name of French sovereignty. The
first was the re-establishment of France in all of her
former rights and possessions. The second was participation
by France on an equal footing with the other allies in for-
mulating policies regarding the defeated Axis powers. As
soon as France and Paris were cleared of German forces in
1944, the de Gaulle Provisional Government lost no time in
seeking to implement their policy of gaining recognition for
14France as one of the world* a great powers. "Only by being
14
Edgar S. Furniss, Jr., "The Twilight of French
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10
admitted to the Councils of the mighty could France partici-
1Spate in decisions vitally affecting her*"
III. BETWEEN THE EAST AND THE WEST
Partially as a result of his wartime efforts to
achieve a position of equality for France among the allies
and restoration as a Great Power , and partially because he
believed that France was not herself and could not exist as
herself without the status of a first-rank power, de Gaulle's
Provisional Government sought to justify her claim to a
position of grandeur and power. "To my mind, France cannot
16be France without greatness. M Economically weak and with
her historical claim to past glory tarnished by her defeat
in 1940 and the humiliation of the Vichy submission, France,
during the immediate postwar period, attempted to remain
aloof from both the East and the West - to act as a mediator,
a bridge as it were between the two opposing entitles, linked
to both but committed to neither.
M. Charles Bidault stated his government's position
quite clearly in November, 1944.
!! »
15Elizabeth Davey (ed.), France in Crisis (New Yorkx
H. W. Wilson Company, 1957), p. 95.
16Charles de Gaulle, War Memoirs, The Call to Honor
1940-1942 , trans. Jonathan GrTFfin (New York" : The~V*iking






It is necessary for France to be able to partici-
pate in the conference of the Great Powers, especially
the European Advisory Council, because the fate and
security of Europe cannot be decided without France*
• • • I believe France can play a valuable part in
forming a bridge between the East and West, • • • to
insure the security of France we are prepared to
conclude pacts which would be in the interest of
France* s and European security* But her own security
does not rest on the Atlantic side only* 2-'
This position was made official in a succinct summa-
tion by M* Bidault at the first debate of the French Consul-
tative Assembly in the same month. "An alliance with the
West; Of course* How could we do otherwise. But an alliance
with the East also* France will never permit herself to be
18limited to the Western part of the world. n This was as
explicit a statement of the French search for security and
independence as could be desired* It was also a declaration
that she would remain undictated to and would achieve this
position by pursuing her own policies between the East and
West.
The unfriendly relations and hard feelings which had
existed between de Gaulle's France and the allies toward the
end of the war, reinforced the natural historic tendency of
the French to insure her security in Europe by the conclu-
sion of a pact with the East* The states of the Little
17Keesinq * s Contemporary Archives , Vol* V, 1943-1946
(London: Keesing's Publication Limited)
, pp. 6807-3.
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Entente had fallen under the spell of the Soviet "liberators,"
and this meant that any Eastern alliance would have to follow
pre-World War I lines in an agreement with Russia* The con-
clusion of an alliance with the U.S.S.R. in December, 1945,
against another German menace, was not only in keeping with
past French diplomatic tradition, but it was also de Gaulle's
way of taking the steps he felt were necessary to assure
French independence of action in the postwar period* As de
Gaulle stated in the fall of 1945:
In the world as it is today, there are two very
great powers, and we lie exactly between them - the
extremity of Europe toward the West, the bridgehead
of Europe with the East! We have only to look at
the map to understand that in this situation, our
vital interests command us to hold a rigorous balance*
In the measure that it depends on us, therefore,
we propose to follow a policy of friendship to the
East and to the West, with our eyes open and our
hands free • • • we know that our balance is identi-
cal with the balance of peace, and we are fully
decided not to abandon it, certain that after vari-
ous oscillations, it is our own attitude which will
finally determine the balance of the needle for the
good of all*i9
The France-Russian Alliance of 1945, however, lost
much of its force and political potency for it was obvious
that Germany would be unable for some considerable time to
menace anyone* It succeeded only partially in freeing the
Provisional Government of France, and subsequent governments,
19McKay, 0£* cit*, pp* 253-254.

13
and allowing them to pursue policies solely of their own
choosing*
The fissures that had existed in the wartime alliance
between the East and West developed into a wide chasm by
1947* The gap which France had sought to bridge had grown
so large between the two blocs that Prance, lacking the
domestic strength to pursue her international schemes, was
drawn back into the Western coalition from which she had
really never strayed very far. Oe Gaulle had sought goals
for France which were unattainable in the chaotic world that
existed after the end of hostilities in World War II and
which were, with France's extremely limited power, impos-
sible of achievement* In 1946, King Haakon of Norway ob-
served :
All the Continental lands were seeking French
leadership to unite them as a bloc between the two
extra-European super-powers; but deGaulle blindly
ignored this chance. He insisted on playing a global
role that France's energies were unable to fulfil 1.20
Contributing to France's continued Western ties was
the domestic factor of the communist threat which made it
imperative that France bolster her economy to serve as a
bulwark against internal communist attacks which were tear-
ing the country apart* The only power capable of such aid
to France was the United States. France's economic and
20
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military weakness, together with her cultural past, his-
toric position, geographical situation, political beliefs,
and spiritual values, brought the French into a closer asso-
ciation and dependence upon the United States and to a
lesser extent, Great Britain, The fact that France stayed
with the West was not due to any deliberate political choice
but simply because she is of the West.
Soviet intransigence and aggressive moves in Eastern
Europe in 1945-1947 and the coup in Prague in 1948 made the
fact of rearmament for France a pressing necessity, not only
to the Anglo-Saxon West, but also to France and Western
Europe. The rapid expansion of her armed forces naturally
resulted in a large drain upon her already overburdened
economy and forced France into a position of even greater
dependence upon the one country which was able to meet her
growing needs, the United States.
Thus, as the cold war grew warmer in the late 1940* s,
France found it necessary, out of sheer need and dependence,
to follow the lead of the United States in the struggle with
communism, to strengthen her ties with the West, and to base
her policies upon United States policy lines. This depend-
ence, was humiliating to all groups within the French
political spectrum. The resentment they felt over her in-
ability to return to the de facto position she had occupied
as a Great Power, and the humiliation at being accorded de
-' 81
15
jure recognition in the United Nations as one of the Big
Five, through the efforts of the "Anglo-Saxons," was fed by
the continued closeness which the latter group exhibited.
The two leading nationalists in Prance at this time, General
de Gaulle and M. Charles Bidault, were grieved at the way
the Anglo-American relationship had matured and broadened
after the end of World War II* They felt that this special
relationship was carried over into the peacetime period
against the best interests of France (and, therefore, Europe),
which was, they believed, being relegated to a position of a
second-rank power in the Western coalition.
IV. DOMESTIC FACTORS
On the domestic scene, the Gaullist Party, the RPF
(Rassemblement du Peuple Francais) or Rally of the French
People, which was launched by de Gaulle in April, 1947, was
violently anti-communist ("Separatists") in its orientation.
This Party, or Union, drew together a motley crew of conser-
vative industrialists, old guard officers, plus a mass
following of the conservative petty bourgeois. The cohesive
elements which bound this conglomerate group of political
outlooks together, was their shared anti-communist and
strong nationalistic feeling. Additionally, they all shared






21France," Basically, however, the RFF was a "union above
parties" dedicated to rescuing the Fourth Republic from the
"tyranny of politics." While it lacked a specific program,
its members believed that only such a Rally, under strong
executive leadership (de Gaulle's) could unite France, re-
capture the national power of France and eliminate the
22
"separatists." The RPF was, thus, essentially not a
political party; "it was the national conscience; it was
23France." The Gaullists believed that the "mystic ue" of
nationalism and the personal "mystique" of their leader
would forge this group into a formidable force on the French
political scene.
Failing to implement his plans for France to stand
between the Cast and West, and unable to control the dissi-
dent elements within his government, de Gaulle resigned in
1946 as President of the Provisional Government, and went
into retirement to await the call of the French people.
That effective government in France is difficult at
best, de Gaulle quickly discovered, because there was a
21John T. Marcus, Neutralism and Nationalism in France
(New York j Bookman Associates, 1953), p. 85.
Marcus, o£. cit
• , p. 87.
Edgar S. Furniss, Jr., Weakness in French Foreign










deep-seated suspicion among French citizens of any move to
develop executive power within the government. After de
Gaulle had stepped down, a feeling of impotence soon crept
across the national consciousness. "Only when France was in
her lowest depths was de Gaulle truly successful • • • •
Only another disaster could restore him to the active
24
scene." At the root of this trouble in France lies a lack
of a sense of citizenship in the people and a distrust of
politics and politicians. The duties of citizens, civic
responsibility, and community cooperation have long been
missing in France because the people are primarily indivi-
duals; only secondary are they in any sense citizens of the
state at large. This then is the foundation of the French
political "imobilisme" which paralyzed the many French
governments through the 1950' s.
From 1945 until the exclusion of the Communists from
the French Cabinet in 1947, the Government majority included
the Communists, Socialists, and the Catholic MRP Party which
composed three-fourths of the Constituent Assembly (later
the National Assembly). It was a left-wing coalition in the
grand tradition of the Bloc des Gauches . After 1947, the
various French governments had to look to the Socialists,
MRP, and the Radical Socialists for support. This was more
O A
Davey, op_. cit
• , p. 83.
-
18
of a coalition of the Center (it drew upon left-wing ele-
ments of the Right and right-wing elements of the Left),
This coalition, which was regularly attacked by both the
Gaullists and the Communists, was more characteristic of the
25Third Republic than of the Bloc des Gauches .
De Gaulle* s view of the cold war power struggle be-
tween the United States and the Soviet Union colored his
attitude toward the organizations in Europe which emerged
during his absence from the active French political scene*
He had been against the development of these institutions
and agencies on a supra-national level. The purpose of the
cooperation which these institutions would establish, he
felt, should not go toward the strengthening of bonds with
the extra-Continental powers (i.e., the United States and
Great Britain) but to establish between the two power masses
a balance in which France could exercise the role of a
mediator in her position as the leader of the European bloc.
In de Gaulle* s stated view, "Great Britain is an island}
26France the cape of a continent; America another world."
V. POSTWAR POLICY
Having remained with the West, France, without de
25
McKay, o£. cit., p. 179.
26





Gaulle, embarked upon a foreign policy which combined four
main parts. The first was the emphasis placed upon recover-
ing physically and psychologically from the devastation of
the war through the means offered by the Marshall Plan?
second, the build-up of her military security through alli-
ances with other Western powers; third, to seek the position
of leadership in promoting Western European unity; and
finally, to seek the gradual admission of Western Germany
into the European structure that was emerging, but on such
terms and conditions that French security was not endan-
27gered.
The French achieved security through the structure of
military alliances that began to take shape in the late
1940' s. The first of these was the Anglo-French Treaty of
Mutual Assistance in 1947, known as the Dunkirk Treaty,
which was directed against any future German aggression.
Like the British, the French realized in the late 1940 f s, in
the face of growing communist aggressive moves, that their
security and that of Western Europe demanded a strong commit-
ment from the United States. To the request of these two
European powers which met in Brussels in March, 1948, with
the Benelux countries, Washington replied in a manner remi-
niscent of the answer given when the Marshall Plan was
27
Davey, 0£. cit • , p. 99
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undertaken. While sympathetic toward the movement, the
United States refused to be drawn into a commitment until
the Europeans demonstrated that they were not only ready,
but willing to throw off the lethargy which had hung over
Europe like a shroud and take the first steps in their own
defense by themselves. This was also a necessary element in
obtaining any type of popular support and Congressional
action in the United States. The Brussels Treaty (Treaty of
Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective
Self-Defence) which emerged in 1948, was Europe's reply. A
year later, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Pact was
signed, firmly committing the United States and Canada to
the defense of Western Europe in peacetime. Despite the
fact she was clearly dependent upon the United States in the
military and economic aid fields, France continued in her
attempt to achieve as much freedom as was possible under the
circumstances of her dependence.
During this same period, the rise of Western Germany
as an economically-resurgent entity was a major cause for
French urgency in leading the way toward European integra-
tion. The obvious fact of the matter began to assert itself.
Germany was no longer a defeated enemy and could not be
treated as such. For this radical and swift change in
Western policies toward a defeated Germany, the cold war was
responsible to an overwhelming extent. The increased
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pressure of cold war tension and the threat of a communist
take-over in Western Europe made the incorporation of West
German forces in the anti-Soviet coalition a vital necessity
for survival, American pressure in the 1950* s forced France
to follow our lead in restoring Germany to the status of a
sovereign state and permit her to make a contribution to the
defense of Western Europe. This situation confronted France
with the spectre of a resurgent Germany over which she would
be able to exercise little or no effective control, and
which could pose a threat to her own security. The French
solution to this dilemma was to link West Germany so closely
to France that she would be unable to break away, to bring
Germany into an integrated Europe in which France would be
the "natural" leader.
By the end of 1950, however, these objectives of
French policy were not reached because of a combination of
external and internal factors. The invasion of Korea on top
of the Prague coup of 1948, made it appear that Europe would
be next in line for communist aggressive designs. Because
of this danger, NATO undertook a program of integration of
the military forces of the member states, and as a conse-
quence had to demand more of France in order to make the
alliance more formidable in the face of what appeared to be
imminent danger. The largest and most important factor
affecting French policy in the light of these developments

22
was the effect of the Korean War, which made the rearmament
of Western Germany and her incorporation into the NATO
framework, of primary importance, Germany was needed to im-
plement the forward strategy of NATO and to fill the gaps
that existed between the forces NATO could muster and those
which were needed to stop any Soviet thrust into Western
Europe* France was in no position to oppose united States
pressure for German rearmament, but there was still much
resistance to American proposals by French leaders who did
not want to see Germany rearmed and in NATO with an equal
voice in the Council of Western powers. She was, at this
time, not absolutely sure that her own strength would be
able to control a rearmed Germany since most of her forces
were committed to military operations in Indo-China and
Algeria. However, because France was so heavily dependent
upon American aid and good will, these same French officials
were unable to counter effectively United States demands on
Germany* s behalf. The French sought to escape from their
dilemma by attacking the unpopular idea in France of German
rearmament and replacing it with the more popular concept of
European integration as envisioned in the plan of M. Rene
Pleven, for a European Political and Defence Community. This
scheme, proposed in 1950, met its fate at the hands of the
Communists and Gaullists in 1954 in a miserable defeat for
its supporters, and a bitter slap at unsolicited and
. "jK*
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unpolished blundering in French politics by the United
States Government. This defeat, besides discrediting the
policy of integration as a whole in the public's eyes,
03
almost brought the European movement to a halt.
VI. GAULLISM AND THE INTERNAL POLITICAL SCENE
At about this same time, the political climate in
France was undergoing another of its periodic changes. The
Right was becoming more attracted to a form of European
integration which might offer some form of guarantee against
"dangerous" economic experiments at home. The Socialists,
on the other hand, plus some Radicals, grew increasingly
suspicious and doubtful. This was increased by the shared
dissatisfaction with the cautious immobility of the conser-
vative governments and the dissipation of French strength
and wealth in the struggle in Indo-China. The Gaullists
shared these feelings.
The military leaders had a strong influence upon the
Gaul list and Right-wing opinion. To them, the submergence
of French identity, and of the independent French army,
seemed an excessive price to pay for avoiding the resurgence
of a German force. For them, the machinery of EOC was also
28
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too complex. All believed in the absence of any democratic
political superstructure, but above all, the absence of
British support and Anglo-American guarantees toward France
in the face of a rearmed Germany made EDC just too much of a
risk for French security. Four years after it was proposed,
the Gaullists campaigned with the neutralists and voted with
them to defeat the Plevan plan.
De Gaulle had seen in this defense organization a
surrender of French sovereignty, a weakening of the French
Union, and abandonment of the French army. For him, the
integration of French forces was anathema, and he has since
reiterated this viewpoint on numerous occasions in regard to
HATO. He stated in 1954 that the EDC,
... would deprive France of self-determination for
fifty years, that is to say forever, take her own army
away from her, forbid her all access to nuclear
weapons, transfer to the American Commander-in-Chief
the sole right to decide how she should be defended
and even whether she should be. 29
The comments of de Gaulle in 1954 are not so very
different from those he has formulated in his arguments
against the integration of French forces within the NATO
command. The reasons for the Gaullist attitude can best be
explained in the nature of Gaullist nationalism and the
changed attitude toward American policies which implied a






The internal dynamics of Gaullism, authoritarianism
and centralization, accented the centrifugal tendencies
within the RPF, and it continued its decline during the
period de Gaulle was absent from the French political scene,
1946-1958. The external situation caused it to collapse.
The Pinay government in 1952 used its power to break the
RPF, for many Gaullists found acceptance in Pinay* s Right
Center government, thus depriving the RPF of one of its main
reasons for existence. This worked upon the rest of the
Party and forced them to combine with the Communists to work
against the middle—a negative coalition at best.
The RPF later organized itself into two rump parties
which threatened to deprive de Gaulle's nationalism of its
chief attribute in the eyes of the public "• • • purity from
30partisan politics." Oe Gaulle disassociated himself from
this group and withdrew from the RPF. "Gaullism without
31de Gaulle - the whole thing was preposterous." Thus was
Gaullism transformed back into a "mystique" entity - a 3tate
of mind - from a partisan movement.
The nationalist concept of an independent France was
described by de Gaulle:
The mission of France, ... consists of doing
everything to prevent the two halves of the world









same time, without ceasing to be members of the
Atlantic alliance, let us organize Europe along
the lines which do not prevent such easement [sic ]
and do not tear us apart* Above all, let us remain
France, sovereign, independent and free. 32
Marcus states that the concept of Gaullist national-
ism excludes, by its very nature, the moves being made in
the direction of supra-national federation in Western Europe.
The Gaullist concept does not envision any abandonment of
33
national sovereignty. Their opposition to the European
Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), and especially to the
European Defence Community, was evidence of this hostility
to the concept of supra-natic nality in these organizations
and their institutions*
What the RPF desired, though it is by no means clear
at all times, was European unity achieved through a more
gradual process which France would be able to channel into a
concert or confederation of sovereign powers and in which
there would be no supra-national ly imposed authority, Just
French leadership*
The neutralists opposed American cold war policies,
and as a result came to oppose Western European integration
which they considered an aspect of American-European policy*
On the other hand, the nationalist Gaulllsts opposed Euro-
pean integration on the principle of supra-nationalism and












federation and, as a consequence, came to oppose United
States policy in Europe as well because of American encour-
agement of the European movement toward federation. Thus,
the nationalists and neutralists came to agree in their
common opposition to United States cold war policies. The
anti-Anglo-American feeling, which had developed from de
Gaulle's wartime relations with the allies, was buried in
the anti-communist period, but emerged in the new anti-
American period.
From nationalism to opposition to the EDC, from
opposition to the EDC to opposition to American
policy in Europe and the Far East, from opposition
to American policy to opposition to the United States
itself, from opposition to the United States to the
assertion that the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. were equal
dangers to the peace, from the equating of these
dangers to the assertion that France must act as a
bridge between the two blocs, such was the long road
traveled by the General and his companions. 35
During the period of his absence from political life,
de Gaulle busied himself writing his War Memoirs , which, in
his third volume, Salvation , contains the clearest statement
he has made regarding his design for France in Europe and on
the international level. The basic theme of this policy has
not changed in the years since its formulation and that his
actions have been directed towards implementing this program.











program as possible before he leaves the position of power
in the direction of French policy which he now holds.
I intended to assure France primacy in western
Europe by preventing the rise of a new Reich that
might again threaten its safety; to cooperate with
the East and West and, if need be, contract the
necessary alliances on one side or the other with-
out ever accepting any kind of dependence; to
transform the French Union into a free association
in order to avoid the as yet unspecified dangers of
upheaval; to persuade the states along the Rhine,
the Alps, and the Pyrenees to form a political,
economic and strategic bloc; to establish this
organization as one of the three world powers and,
should it become necessary, as the arbitor between
the Soviet and Anglo-American camps. Since 1940,
my every word and act had been dedicated to estab-
lishing these possibilities; now that France was
on her feet again, I would try to realize them, 36
VII, THE GAULLIST GOALS
The goals which de Gaulle desires France to attain in
Europe and in the international world may have their origin
in his sense of France* s mystical leadership ability, but
they would seem to stem more from his hard-headed sense of
realism and practicality than any mysticism. To some of
de Gaulle's critics, his motives and actions have been
ascribed to his personal ambitions, resentment, and the
frustration he feels toward the Anglo-American grouping. It
would appear to be sheer folly, however, to attribute to a
36Charles de Gaulle, War Memoirs , Salvation 1944-1946 ,









man of his stature and beliefs such factors as these exert-
ing a major influence upon his policy formulation,
De Gaulle is first and foremost a realist, though he
may be a romantic at heart. He realizes that for Prance to
be able to enter the realm of the super-powers and compete
with them as an equal in world affairs, she must be able to
at least approach, if not equal, their economic and military
capabilities. France by herself does not have a reservoir
of strength or the great bases of power possessed by both
the United States and the Soviet Union. She has neither the
population nor the geographic extent of the two Great Powers,
and her production and resources are no match alone for the
United States and Russia. Therefore, France needs Europe
and de Gaulle realizes it. She needs a European grouping of
states which will recognize the innately superior qualities
of leadership which France has to offer and be willing to
accept the advantages which such leadership will bring, if
the states of Europe will but follow her lead. This is the
background against which de Gaulle is constructing his
European policy, which in conjunction with his Atlantic
policy, best seen in his actions regarding NATO, will launch
his movement for French leadership in Europe, the momentum
of which will be difficult to stop once underway.
A 19tb century nationalist and fundamentalist, de
Gaulle personally is not attracted to the European







Community he is trying to shape not as the germ of a
super-power but as a constellation centered on France,
giving his country the weight and authority it needs
to assert itself and create a third force between the
U. S. and Russia. 37
To implement his plans de Gaulle is depending upon
Germany* s desire to remain quiescent in her attempt to
remove any European fears of a revival of Nazism, De Gaulle
hopes to keep Germany in this role of a non-assertive power
submissively following France's lead in organizing Europe.
Just how long Germany will accept this position of built-in
inferiority now that "Der Alte" has left the Chancellorship
and under persistent American pressure remains to be seen.
De Gaulle visualizes this Europe of tomorrow, though
he most certainly does not expect it to be achieved in his
time, as being completely independent of Soviet or American
influence. It will be strong enough to defend itself and
will not have to look to the United States deterrent to pre-
vent or to win an aggressive war directed at Western Europe.
It will be able to take care of its own defenses be they
nuclear or conventional. Additionally, Great Britain will
still remain on the outside just as long as she continues to
favor her relationship with the U. S. over the acceptance of
French leadership in the "new" Europe.
37Ray Alan, "Anatomy of Gaullism,*1 The New Leader ,








From this "constellation" of sovereign states which
will be in effect directed from Paris, the principal pro-
ducers of hard goods, France and Germany, will wear down the
iron curtain of Eastern Europe by supplying the "gutted
Eastern markets," This, in turn, will produce a more com-
fortable and stable group of states within the Soviet satel-
lete orbit and will bring about an era of peaceful co-
38
existence from the Atlantic to the Urals.
The concept of the "third force" in Western Europe,
and the "neutralist" policy which the French attempted to
pursue in 1944-1946, are clearly linked. During the period
when de Gaulle was out of public office, 1946-1958, Great
Britain remained aloof from the Continental Europeans while
enjoying to the fullest her close tie with the United States,
This caused the security-minded French to reorient their
policy from a Franco-British bloc or alliance toward a
Franco-German rapprochement . Thus, the "third force" as it
will emerge in the "new" Europe will be Franco-German cen-
tered.
The concept of France in a federated Europe which
will develop along the lines it has in the past holds no
appeal for de Gaulle. He does not want a United States of
38George W. Herald, "Charles De Gaulle's Abstractions,"
The New Leader, XLVI (February 18, 1963), 14.
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Europe even if it is led by France, for in this concept
there would have to be some abrogation of French sovereignty
and freedom of choice and decision which goes against de
Gaulle's plans.
It is to be expected that de Gaulle will take what-
ever action he must to exploit every single opportunity and
possibility of increasing French power and prestige in
Europe, and as a world force to be met and dealt with as an
equal by the states now controlling the world's destiny.

CHAPTER II
DE GAULLE'S RETURN TO POWER, 1958
General de Gaulle, during his period of political
retirement, was critical of both the Marshall Plan and the
North Atlantic Treaty Pact, because he believed them to be
too vague to be of lasting value to France, and because as a
devout nationalist, he felt they "represented the subordina-
tion of France to American dictates." While the structure
and organization of NATO has met with his criticism, the
2principle underlying the Pact has not. He has been agree-
able to the proposition that France needed and should have
military power and equipment consistent with the prestige of
a great nation. It was for this reason that his RPF Party
agreed to support French rearmament as requested by the NATO
Council.
Upon his return to the political scene in June, 1958,
and his subsequent investure as President of the Fifth
Republic, de Gaulle revealed himself clearest in his actions
and attitudes toward the East-West confrontation and NATO.
Edgar S. Furniss, Jr., France ; Keystone of Western
Defense (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1954)
,
p. 9.
2Herbert Luethy and David Rodnick, French Motivations
in the Suez Crisis (Princeton: The Institute for Inter-
national Social Research, 1956), p. 54.
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He risked no major changes initially, but he was determined
to re-establish France's right to be consulted as an equal
3
and to "assert every French prerogative to the full," It
was no coincidence that Paris became more and more the
center of international meetings and the headquarters of
NATO.
In regard to the North Atlantic alliance he stated
that he did not intend to dismantle it, but on the contrary
he declared emphatically:
We do not contemplate a change in our NATO policy.
We regard NATO as necessary and France will not leave
the alliance. But we will cease practicing our mem-
bership in the same way we practiced it in the past.
There are other ways. Only if there is no comprehen-
sion of our viewpoint would we be forced to take back
our liberty of action. 4
On this point, he speaks in a manner reminiscent of
that speech made in Algiers in 1944 to the Consultative
Assembly in which he stated that it was "the governments
5policy to make itself heard and understood." This he has
been trying to do for years with his allies, without much
apparent success. Now he was trying again.
3Philip M. Williams and Martin Harrison, De Gaulle's




C. L. Sulzberger, The Test t De Gaulle and Algeria
(New York: Harcourt, Brace and WorlcT7 Inc., 1962), p. 116.
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Over the years, de Gaulle has continually repeated
his desire to maintain the alliance* His latest such procla-
mation came at his press conference of July 29, 1963, follow-
ing the signing of a partial nuclear test ban between the
United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union. He
stressed the fundamental factors of French-American relations
which are friendship and the alliance. Noting that friend-
ship between the two countries is now almost two hundred
years old, de Gaulle said that "such a moral capital cannot
be diminished. " Regarding the alliance, de Gaulle stated:
... it is a fact that it now exists and that the
two countries have every reason to maintain it.
Indeed, as long as the free world is faced with
the Soviet bloc, ... the peoples on both sides of
the ocean, if they wish to defend themselves, must
be linked together.
The Atlantic Alliance is therefore an elementary
necessity. 7
Oe Gaulle's insistence upon claiming an equal place
for France in the alliance with Great Britain and the United
States has been his most consistent critique of the relation-
ships that exist within NATO. He believes that NATO makes
France a dependent nation deprived of her freedom of action.
In line with this, he firmly believes that the United States
Press Conference of President de Gaulle in The New









and Great Britain, not forced initially into such a subser-
vient role, would deploy their forces in their own national
interests, even though such action might entangle the other
NATO partners against their wishes in areas outside their
concern and NATO's. Such was the case with Cuban confronta-
tion in 1962, when the United States forced the Soviet Union
to back: down. In European circles, it was believed that the
confrontation could have easily resulted in bringing destruc-
tion upon the countries of Western Europe over a problem and
question that did not directly involve them, and was far
removed from the NATO orbit. The political consultation
within the alliance seemed to be undertaken in an ex post
facto manner, much to the dismay not only of General de
Gaulle, but of the other members of the alliance, especially
Great Britain and Germany. It seemed further proof that not
much has been accomplished in bettering the problem of
political consultation in NATO since the severe break in
1956.
France has always laid claim to a "special role" in
NATO because of her position, geographically, within Europe
which fact made her participation in NATO an absolute neces-
sity. Without France there just could be no defense of
Western Europe. She is the pivotal point in Europe. She
sits across NATO supply lines to forces in Germany; NATO
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the alliance, and she alone is within the periphery of the
circles embracing the many organizations in the military,
economic and social sphere of the "new" Europe* She is the
heart of the alliance. "France recognizes its central posi-
tion and has used it to extract the maximum of military aid
and diplomatic recognition at the least possible sacrifice
p
to its own national interests .
"
De Gaulle knows France is needed to maintain the
alliance, and he has used this as grounds to base his argu-
ment for equality in NATO policy direction.
As 1959 wore on, it was evident to foreign observers
that the intransigence, which was de Gaulle* s special stock
in trade, was not dead but had only lain quiescent while he
was inactive politically. His return to power signaled a
new series of moves to gain for France the recognition she
needed before attaining the greatness that was deemed her
right. In pursuit of his goals, de Gaulle set about trying
to improve France's relative position with the NATO alliance.
I. THE NATO PROPOSALS
On October 25, 1958, President Charles de Gaulle
Eileen R. Donovan, et &1 • , "The Future of NATO: An
Outline of Probable Strengths and Weaknesses Over the Next
Ten Years," Foreign Service Institute, United States Depart-
ment of State (Washington: Senior Seminar in Foreign Policy,








addressed personal letters to President Eisenhower and Prime
Minister MacMillan, and an aide-memoire to other NATO mem-
bers, in which he gave each of these leaders in the alliance
his concept of Prance's proper role in NATO, While the
exact content of the letters was not made known to the
public, enough was "leaked" to enable all to know that de
Gaulle proposed modifications in the alliance along three
specific lines.
That deGaulle should find it possible to come out
openly against the influence of the United States in
NATO was a sign that he not only felt it was essential
that he should make his stand against the atom-
carrying bombers flying from Prench bases, but that
he believed that Prance was fully strong enough to
make herself heard and understood despite the opposi-
tion of America and Britain.
9
First, he protested that, while NATO was composed of
fifteen sovereign nations, the really important decisions
were taken by either the United States alone, or in concert
with Great Britain, in what had been termed the "Anglo-
American Partnership." He, therefore, urged that this dual
relationship be expanded to include France in a triumvirate.
This proposal came about mainly because of the decision of
the United States and Great Britain to take concerted action
9Stanley F. Clark, The Han Who is France : The Story
of General Charles DeGaulle (New York":"" Dodd , Mead and""
Company, 1963), p. 233.
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in Jordan and Lebanon without first consulting him. He
further believed that the trouble in these countries, Jordan
and Lebanon, stemmed directly from the abortive action con-
ducted by the Anglo-French forces in Sues in 1956. The
intercession of the United States in this joint Anglo-French
operation, in opposition to the move by its "partners" in
Egypt, not only precipitated the later crisis, de Gaulle
believed, but made the British rush to restore the exclusive
relationship with the United States. This led to a shift in
the balance within NATO so that by 1958 the United States
and Great Britain had drawn closer together and France was
on the outside looking in.
On the second point, de Gaulle urged that the three-
power directorate not restrict Itself to Just the area
covered by the NATO Treaty, but that it be extended to cover
the areas where Soviet advances were being made or were
threatening to encircle and isolate the West. The United
States and the United Kingdom were working to meet these
threats, but the specific French objection lay in the fact
that they were doing so without permitting her to be a party
to the decisions. De Gaulle believes that NATO's future
lies outside the present limits of its Treaty responsibilities,
Edgar S. Furniss, Jr., France , Troubled Ally ,
DeGaulle's Heritage and Prospects (New York i Frederick A.














and, therefore, should be extended to include Africa where
France had commitments to defend her former colonies.
France's attitude on national defense continually empha-
sizes the point that her strategic responsibilities extend
from Dunkirk to Brazzaville. De Gaulle's objective in making
this point was to gain a larger voice in the overall policy
planning of the Western powers in the non-NATO areas. He
had based this upon France's global responsibilities. The
global nature of these "responsibilities" in 1958 and later
consisted of France's commitments to her former colonies,
some of which remained in the new French Community. France
also had commitments to those new states which had concluded
cooperative agreements with France, but which did not choose
to associate themselves in the Community. The problem with
this is that the position upon which France bases her argu-
ment for an equal voice outside the NATO area rests upon
12these African commitments, and they are "built upon sand."
For example, two new states, Mali and Togo, refused to sign
political agreements with France. Others have refused to
enter into common defense arrangements, preferring more
freedom of action. In many of the remaining African states,
i:LIbid
., p. 465.
12Geoffrey Warner, "President DeGaulle's Foreign
Policy," World Today , 18 (August, 1962), 325.
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there has been considerable pressure upon the governments to
take a more "African" line rather than to continue to pursue
a "French" policy.
The second proposal by de Gaulle has been modified
slightly according to M. Peyrefitte, the French Minister of
Information. In a speech on Canadian television in June,
1962, he outlined the current French concept.
In the absence of an extension of the geographical
area of the pact, France proposes that, outside N.A.T.O.
and for world problems which N.A.T.O. cannot resolve,
the three western powers which have global responsibili-
ties shall cooperate closely. There is no question of
a three-power directorate within N.A.T.O., but of a
close co-operation of the Big Three outside N.A.T.O.
in order to fill N.A.T.O. gaps.* 3
In the third proposal, de Gaulle stated that France
had been denied her share of important positions within the
command structure of NATO. SHAPE was assuming all the pro-
portions of an American military staff. The command struc-
ture, de Gaulle emphasizes, "exhibits the careful concern
14for autonomy of the United Kingdom and the United States."
SACEUR, in de Gaulle's opinion, is not truly representative
of the country that would be most affecte:" in the event of
future aggression in Western Europe.
1 3Ibid . t p. 324.
14Edgar S. Furniss, Jr., "DeGaulle's France and NATO:




De Gaulle feels that the relatively withdrawn posi-
tions of the United States and Great Britain might lead them
to develop a more attenuated sense of commitment to European
defense than France. The "potential disparity in involve-
ment had accentuated the desperate allocation of military
15
responsibility within the alliance. 1 ' Further, the largest
proportion of United States and British troops are not com-
mitted to NATO. They are scattered throughout the world
fulfilling commitments outside the NATO alliance system
which could have serious repercussions upon the non-committed
and usually non-consulted NATO partners.
To de Gaulle, the integration of French troops into
NATO is nothing more than a fragmentation of that portion of
French power. In this regard, he argues that in the NATO
defense structure, France and Germany are designated to
furnish the majority of land forces while the United States
and the United Kingdom support the alliance with air power,
missiles, and ships. De Gaulle was quick to point out that
these operating principles within NATO reflect the inferior
position given France. This organization for the defense of
an area which is so vital to France should not be dominated
by two nations for whom Western Europe might not be as
indispensable at some future time and under different







circumstances. Such a concept the United States has been
trying to dispel for some time, generally not meeting with
much success in convincing most Europeans, especially de
Gaulle.
As a realist, de Gaulle appreciates his rather tenu-
ous bargaining position. This is one of the main reasons for
his concentration upon building a united Europe around French
leadership, "as a kind of insurance policy" to enable France
to continue to talk to the Anglo-American's on an equal
17footing. French leadership in Europe is accepted, by the
French at least, as inevitable because of the almost submis-
sive role Germany has accepted in Europe and because Western
Germany has to a great extent been neutralized by the Paris-
Bonn Axis and the close relationship between de Gaulle and
Chancellor Adenauer.
II. ANTI-INTEGRATION POLICY AND NATO
The points which de Gaulle placed before America and
Great Britain, in his letter, were aired at the December,
1958, meeting of the NATO Council, at which time it was
clear that unless the structure of the NATO organization
were modified to meet some of France* s objections, NATO
would get little from France in the future.
16 1
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Failing to get the concessions sought, de Gaulle,
early in 1959, embarked upon a policy toward NATO in which
France withdrew the French Fleet from operational control of
NATO's Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Mediterranean, with-
drew her strategic Fighter Air Force from the unified air
defense system for Western Europe, refused to allow stock-
piling of nuclear weapons upon her soil, and refused to
permit the installation of IRBM sites in France. By these
measures, which were not wholly tactical in nature, de
Gaull hoped to pressure the United States into accepting
his proposals. At the same time, they gave a clearer indi-
cation of his attitude toward the alliance, which, in his
opinion, should be based upon the principle of coalition
rather than of integration.
DeGaulle is at heart, ... innately suspicious of
the NATO concept of an interdependent and integrated
military structure. He appears to feel that the secu-
rity and national interests of France are best
protected by a return to the original NATO concept of
an alliance of independent national states and
national forces. 1 **
Thus, when NATO placed the missiles, which de Gaulle refused,
in Turkey and Italy, he was not rebuffed in the slightest.
19This coincided exactly with his preferences for independence.
At his first press conference, March 25, 1959, after
18Donovan, o£. cit
• , p. 23.
19Williams and Harrison, o£. cit
. , p. 177.
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assuming the Presidency of the Fifth Republic, de Gaulle
attempted to clarify his position in regard to the alliance*
One might think, . . • that France might consider
keeping out of the quarrel. Being without means of
action, that is to say of destruction, equal to those
in the hands of the Americans and the Russians, and
thus of power to try and impose her policy, she might
try to keep outside the conflict and in the last
resort of war. This would amount to France *s giving up
her reasons for living in an attempt to keep her life*
But also this would be to destroy the Atlantic
Alliance, which is unimaginable without the partici-
pation of France.
We prefer to maintain the Alliance until the day
when peace sees its future assured. 20
He states, however, that he believed the alliance
would be,
... more alive and stronger the more the great
states which are part of it unite on the basis of a
cooperation where each pays his way rather than on
that of integration where the states and peoples and
governments see themselves, within the sacred domain
of their own defense, deprived more or less of their
role and responsibilities. 21
M. Louis Joxe, a member of the Debrk Cabinet, in a
speech on October 20, 1959, pointed out that while France
contributed land forces to the shield of NATO, there was not
given to her in the system an adequate measure of respon-
sibility for making decisions of strategy that would affect






these French forces. But beyond this, Joxe stated, "France
considers that the integration of forces has disadvantages
22
of a moral nature." This is a point which de Gaulle had
continually stressed and which on November 3, 1959, he made
quite clear in its meaning.
A country like France can make war only if it is
her own war. The effort must be her own effort. If
such were not the case, if we allowed the defense of
France to be entrusted over the long period to non-
national agencies or to be fused or confused with
something else, it would no longer be possible for us
to maintain the idea of the State. As for our mili-
tary command ... if this were only one element in a
hierarchy which did not belong to us, its authority
would rapidly disappear. The system known as "inte-
gration , " which was introduced and even put into
practice to some extent after we had undergone great
trials, and when we had not yet recovered our national
entity, and at a time when it was thought that the
free world was confronted by an unbound danger; such
systems of integration have had their day. 23
While de Gaulle believes that France needs allies and
that, in certain circumstances, she must coordinate the
defense of France with these allies, it does not alter his
anti-integration attitude. He believes that integration
would be an abdication of France* s rights as a Great Power
—
she must claim her place among the great powers by virtue of
the respect which is due her because of her past history.
22Roger Massip, "DeGaulle, Europe and NATO," Western







DE GAULLE'S EUROPE DES PATRIE3 AND
HIS ATLANTIC POLICY
The Europe of de Gaulle is not the Europe which the
true "Europeans, " M. Jean Monnet, M. Robert Schuman, and M.
Maurice Faure, hope will emerge as a future federalist
entity. The Gaullist vision of Europe differs from that of
the "Europeans " in purpose as well as in method. The Gaul-
lists desire to break away from American tutelage and
dominance, which is expressed in the NATO organisation,
while the "Europeans" think more about expanding existing
Atlantic integration (NATO) into a closer partnership in
terms of a North Atlantic Community* De Gaulle* s views of a
Confederation of European sovereign states were spelled out
in his press conference statements of September 5, I960.
To build Europe, that is to say, to unite it, is
evidently something essential. It is trite to ask why
this great centre of civilisation, of strength, of
reason, of prosperity, is being smothered by its own
ashes. What is necessary, to build Europe, is to pro-
ceed, not by following our dreams, but according to
realities.
Now what are the realities of Europe <* What are the
pillars on which it can be built; ... States are the
only entities that have the right to make decrees and
France and the European Community , Occasional Paper
No. 11 ( London :"" Political and Economic Planning, 1961),
pp. 9-10.
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the authority to act* To imagine that we can create
effective means of action, supported by the peoples,
above and beyond the member states is nothing but an
illusion. 2
If this is an accurate reflection of de Gaulle's
views on uniting Europe, where does this place the organiza-
tions and institutions which France not only promoted but to
which she had committed herself before the return of de
Gaulle in 1958:
De Gaulle has been placed in the position of having
to accept what has gone before. He has accepted the SEC and
the institutions of the Communities partly because they were
obligations which had to be met under existing treaty pro-
visions. His formal acquiescence came on December 28, 1958,
when he decided that France should be permitted to partici-
pate in the Common Market on an equal basis with the other
members of the Community. He felt that, in addition to the
obligations under the Rome Treaty, the long-range nature of
the EEC and its lack of federative aspects would not make
France's participation seem a surrender of his principles of
confederation. While accepting the Communities and their
institutions (partially out of fear, too, of alienating the
other members if his opposition were too strong), he
2Ibid .
Edgar S. Furniss, Jr., France Under De Gaulle (New
York: Foreign Policy Association, tnc, 196uT, p. 47.
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undertook a policy of attempted reform in the existing in-
stitutions and the channelization of future Community devel-
opments, especially along the lines of political cooperation,
in the direction of confederation.
Regarding the Institutional framework of the European
economic Community, de Gaulle, in his conference with the
press on September 5, 1960, said;
As long as nothing serious happens, they function
fairly well without too much trouble, but as soon as
something dramatic happens and a serious problem has
to be settled, it can be seen that no High Authority
has political authority; it is only the states which
have it.
^
The same thought was expressed by M* Michael Debre at
Metz on October 2, I960.
European Unity cannot be created solely through
institutions.
In Europe, legitimate power is the power which
comes from national sovereignty and against this
power arbitrary outside tyranny's like the so-
called "supra-national'1 institutions can do
nothing •
5
*• L' EUROPE PES PATRIE5
In July, 1959, a little more than a year after taking
office, President de Gaulle presented a plan to the other
members of the EEC, which would modify the Community and its




institutions into a confederal organization and also re-
strict future political developments within the Community to
a confederation of sovereign yet separate members. This was
the beginning of the de Gaulle plan for L* Europe des Patrles .
The plan for confederation had five main features
which were outlined by M. Alain Peyrefitte in Le Monde in a
series of articles on "The Future of Europe.
"
The first feature of the new system was that all
political initiative would remain with the respective govern-
ments. Member states would then not have to risk becoming
involved in any matter which might threaten their own inter-
ests. In the Confederation, there would be no fear of an
assembly gaining a dominating position for each government
would keep the control of all political matters in their own
7hands.
The second important point in the de Gaulle plan is
that European policy would be formulated at the "summit" by
the Heads of Government. Coordination and the implementation
6
In the light of later developments on the Fouchet
Committee, these articles which appeared in Le Monde on
September 15, 16, 17, and 18, 1960, presented"""a clear and
incisive outline of just what de Gaulle wants. While out-
side official government circles at the time these articles
appeared, M. Peyrefitte nevertheless reflected quite ac-
curately the government* s position which was later revealed
in the Fouchet Committee discussions and the meetings of the
Heads of State.






of such policy would be the work of national authorities
acting directly* "At the highest level, problems which have
occupied the technocrats for weeks can often be solved at a
3
single session when they are treated as political problems.
The third feature of the Confederal structure would
lie in the priority given to the coordination of foreign and
defense policies. Political union, M. Peyrefitte points
out, would be able to protect such interests a country might
have which it would be unable to safeguard as a single State.
At the same time, the Confederal principle would leave the
State free to act as its own interests dictate*
De Gaulle's favorite political stratagem, that of a
direct appeal to the people in the form of referendums, is
the fourth feature* Such appeals would be an essential part
of a Confederated Europe, until such time as it was deter-
mined that progress was sufficiently far advanced as to
permit direct elections to the European Parliament* In this
feature, de Gaulle stresses that the voice of the people
will be heard and will play an active part in the building
of the "new" Europe*
As with all the organisations which have appeared in
the "new" Europe, the de Gaulle plan has a transition period
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difficulty as possible. This feature of progressiveness has
the transition period divided into several stages, corres-
ponding roughly to the expected pattern of development of
the political Community.
In the initial stage, the Heads of Government would
meet every three months for "summit" discussions. The re-
spective national ministers of the various departments of
each government would organize themselves into working com-
mittees or groups. In all cases, at this stage, decisions
would be taken unanimously.
The second stage would have the Heads of Government
meeting more frequently, perhaps once a month, and there
would also be a referendum for the people to express their
opinions on the development of the Confederation* At this
stage, decisions would be taken by a weighted and qualified
majority vote.
A second referendum would be held when it was deemed
appropriate and with the acceptance of the people the Con-
federal Pact, which until then joined the member states,
would be changed into a Charter of Confederation. This then
would mark the third and final, irreversible stage of the
plan. At this point, all decisions would be reached by a
straight majority vote, though it would be weighted.
The French official view of Europe organized under






popular view, however, assumes that this Europe would be
more or less a reversion to the intergovernmental approach
encountered in the Council of Europe and the OEEC (Organiza-
tion for European Economic Cooperation ) . In such an organi-
sation, the Council of Ministers would be supreme and reach
their decisions by unanimous vote* Such a structure in the
past has proved frustrating and in the plan for European
Confederation could easily result in nothing being accomp-
lishes the institutions set up under that system. For
this reason, the French official view accepts the principle
of majority voting in the second and third stages of transi-
tion. This will ensure that in these stages the Confedera-
tion will be able to get something done without being bogged
down by a veto. In the first and formative stage of the
transition period, however, when the most important political
decisions on the future of the European Community would be
expected to take place, unanimous voting will be the rule.
As mentioned previously, the decision-making process
would be exclusively reserved to the representatives of the
sovereign national governments. In such a procedure, each
member would undoubtedly be influenced by his state* s par-
ticular national interests. The outcome would most probably
be compromise which in practice would mean the acceptance
and acquiescence by the smaller members to the policies of
the larger more powerful members - France and Germany.
•ftlui o
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Attainment of any measure of agreement on policy matters
within the Community would be possible only by a continuing
concert of interest between the larger members - a perpetua-
tion of the understanding which is now embodied in the
9Paris-Bonn Axis.
In the area of foreign policy formulation in the
European Confederation, Pryce states:
The adoption of a majority-voting system without
the participation in the preparatory stage of a body
charged with the formulation of proposals suited to
the Community's interest as a whole could also have
disasterous consequences . 10
Thus, in the absence of any Community executives such
as the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Com-
munity (ECSC) or the Commissions of the ESC and EURATOM, it
would be almost impossible to avoid a direct clash of na-
tional interests* The chances for success of such a system
in relation to the decision-making process would seem to be
small indeed* Additionally, there would be a very serious
weakness in that such a system would be devoid of responsi-
bility to the Community as a whole*
Concerning the Parliamentary mechanism of the Con-
federation, de Gaulle does not advocate any such effective
organization* While he considers it desirable to have
9Roy Pryce, The Political Future of the European
Community (London: John Marshbank Limited", 1962), p. 53*





popular support obtained through the referenduras, this is
not really a direct part of the governmental process* He
envisions it more as a cheering section which stays on the
political side lines* The Parliamentary body in this case
is only for show* It is not expected to take any direct
action in the decision-making process of the Community* *
The Gaul list view of the Community's political
future is, in fact, the present Fifth Republic writ
large - a sobering thought for those who are inclined
to view Europe des Patrles as a welcome and acceptable
philosophy for the future .H
The main objective of the French government and de
Gaulle in proposing to establish new institutions, espe-
cially the joint political secretariat which would be
responsible to the Heads of Government and the gradual evo-
lution of a Confederation, is the development of common
policies among the Six* This is an essential feature of the
Gaullist goal of French leadership of a European "third
force."
The Gaullists believe that the sovereignty of states
is the only basis of political authority and reality* They
reject completely the concept of supra-nationallty* Thus,
the existing institutions of the European Communities are
only instruments of governmental cooperation* They cannot






have an authority above and beyond that of national govern-
ments. While they function well in times of tranquillity,
times of crisis they will fail for they cannot overrule
12
national interests and national institutions*
This confederal plan for Europe came out just six
months after M. Couve de Murville had effectively ended the
European Free Trade Association (EFTA) negotiations with
Great Britain. It did not, however, find much favor among
the other five members of the EEC, particularly with the
Belgian and Dutch governments. Against this initial opposi-
tion in the European Commission, the plan fell into the
13background of other Community matters until July, 1960.
In July, 1960, there began a series of ministerial
discussions initiated by the French in a new drive to imple-
ment de Gaulle's ideas. The first discussion took place at
Rambouillet between President de Gaulle and Chancellor
Adenauer on July 29-30. These two European leaders dis-
cussed at some length the future development of political
cooperation in Europe. Following this Heads of State con-
sultation were further meetings between French ministers and
the ministers of the other EEC members.
From late August through early October, 1960, there
12France and the European Community , op . cit.
,
p. 5.
"Reversal of Alliances , " The Economist , CCVI






were more French-initiated ministerial discussions in Paris
and Rambouillet at which de Gaulle and his ministers ex-
pounded upon the French plan for a Confederated Europe and
sounded out the other members* reactions. At the same time,
the five other members of the EEC held meetings among them-
selves to discuss the merits of the French plan for the
Community*
On February 10, 1961, a special committee on politi-
cal cooperation within the Community was established in
Paris under a French chairman, M. Christian Fouchet. This
committee was charged with the task of considering a French
draft treaty for political union, or confederation, among
the member states. Many meetings were held by the committee
in consideration of the French proposal, but in April, 1962,
it all came to an end when the Belgian and Dutch governments
refused to continue the discussions until Britain's request
for membership in the Community had been acted upon. De
Gaulle, it appeared, did not want Great Britain in the Com-
munity at that time, not until he had consolidated French
leadership within the Six to such an extent that Great
Britain would be forced to follow the French lead. This was
confirmed by his statements on January 14, 1963, at his
press conference.
14





There was also within France at this time a grave
concern that with the admission of Britain into the EEC this
would open the doors to Denmark and Norway and enlarge the
present Six to such a size that France might not be able to
exert her influence* The French knew what the Europe of the
Six was like and how it functioned and could probably be
made to function in the future. No one, including President
de Gaulle, was certain just what a European Community of
nine or more members would be like or exactly how it would
function institutionally. The biggest uncertainty was, of
course, the question of French control over such an expanded
Community.
For a time after the protests of the Belgian and
Dutch governments, de Gaulle put off his idea, until his
tour of the Federal German Republic in the fall of 1962. At
this time he brought up his scheme for Europe again but in
15the form of an association between France and West Germany.
It would be organized much in the same way as the Western
European Confederation plan studied by the Fouchet committee.
It had the advantage over the plan presented to the Fouchet
committee in that it did not include all the members of the
Six, just the two most powerful states. Thus, the smaller
states would have to fall in line or be left in isolation
IS





within the Community. A fate which, because of the nature
of the Community and its organisational make-up, would
probably be worse than being isolated as an outsider. Addi-
tionally it meant that Great Britain would not be included
regardless of the results at Brussels on her application.
This is the background which led up to the Treaty of Franco-
German Cooperation which was signed on January 22, 1963*
The question still remains; how long will Germany under a
new Chancellor be content to watch France mold a Europe to
de Gaulle's image, in which Germany could at best occupy
only the position next to the top?
The conclusion of the Franco-German Treaty does not
imply an abandonment of de Gaulle's scheme to incorporate
the Six into a European Confederation of some sort. The
problem for de Gaulle is that the European movement toward
federation may have gone too far to halt. At present, he
has succeeded in stopping its forward movement, but he may
not have the power or skill to bring his plan to fruition.
The projects for real political integration, popular vote
for the European Parliament, and merging of the executives
of the three Communities (EEC, ECSC, and EURATOM) have been









II. FRANCE'S EUROPEAN POLICY AND NATO
To gain for France the leadership of a Confederated
Europe that will assume pre-eminence as a force in a world
of the two super-powers, de Gaulle must first see that
France is supreme in Europe* France's power, he believes,
after several past "oscillations" in the world power arena,
is now on an upward curve which will culminate in her achiev-
ing the pinnacle of power as the leader of the Western
European grouping. His immediate and central goal in for-
eign policy is, however, leadership in Europe* All of the
tactics and opportunities he has utilized, his demands upon
NATO, his intransigence in the United Nations, and the
blocking of Britain's entry into Europe, while they have
shaken Western unity, are part of his means to achieve his
end*
M. Pompidou, the French Prime Minister, told the
National Assembly, on April 27, 1962, that France's "European
policy has become the very foundation of France's foreign
16policy* H This statement should be a matter of consider-
able interest and importance to France's partners in NATO
and the EEC* This is particularly true in the light of
developments after his statement; i.e., the French veto of
16Geoffrey Warner, "President OeGaulle's Foreign








Great Britain and the signing of the Franco-German Treaty in
January , 1963. There is now much speculation on both sides
of the Atlantic that de Gaulle's European policy is not
aimed solely at altering the balance within the NATO alii*
ance or increasing French influence and prestige in the
Council of the NATO powers, but at creating a true "third
force" which would stand between the United States and the
17Soviet Union.
Certainly the past writings and speeches of President
de Gaulle tend to support this belief and his more recent
utterances confirm it. In a speech at Gueret on May 19
,
1962, de Gaulle stated:
Political union must take place so that our western
Europe will form an entity, so that there will not
only be two opposing colossi in the world, but also a
great force and a great diffusion of wisdom, and it is
Europe alone which can provide this element. ... but
our hope is that the day will come when Europe will
play a distinguished role as arbitor of world peace. 18
What must be clearly understood is that implied in de
Gaulle's statement is the fact that the Europe of which he
speaks is a Europe under French political guidance. This
is, to de Gaulle, the "natural" order of things. Europe,
without France as the political leader, would not be capable















true "third force, " But with Europe in a "Francofied"
political version of European Union, there would emerge a
"third force" of Gaullist vision* Speaking at Limoges on
May 21, 1962, de Gaulle saw one ultimate result of this.
There will no longer be only the two colossi which
we know, there will also be Europe and then, in the
last resort, when the virilence of regimes has dis-
appeared - the peoples will come together once more
and cooperate. -^
One further result that the "third force" will bring
about will be the raising of the iron curtain. As de Gaulle
emphasized at Montbehaid on June 17, 1962:
Then this great Europe from the Atlantic to the
Urals - this Europe, with the help of the New World
which is its son, will be able to solve the problem
of the misery of 2,000 million human beings in the
underdeveloped countries .20
In a masterpiece of low-keyed French understatement,
M. Herve Alphand, after de Gaulle's January 14 press confer-
ence which shocked and all but ruptured the Western alliance,
said:
The policies of the French government in two impor-
tant fields - organization of defense and construction
of a United Europe - recently caused a certain amount
of turmoil in the Free World. 21
French foreign policy today, M. Alphand elaborated,
1 9Ibid . t citing Le Monde, May 22, 1962.
20
Ibid ., citing Le Monde , June 19, 1962.
21





contains the twin concepts of alliance and independence.
The greatest of these, if there can be a clear separability
between the two, is independence. For France to maintain
her independence, including her freedom of political action,
she must have a national defense that is adequate to defend
herself against any possible threat* Such an independent
national defense program requires certain political and
economic conditions to be met before its desired end can be
achieved* France has been able to fulfill these conditions
only under de Gaulle*
Today, France's national defense is based upon a re-
organized military structure, which is divided into three
basic groups* The first force is the one earmarked for the
defense of the motherland* A second force is set aside for
purposes of intervention, to aid the African countries te
which France is bound by defense agreements* This force
includes the French forces now stationed in Germany* The
third force, politically the most important one, is the
strategic nuclear force* This will be covered in greater
detail under the section on the Force de Frappe in this
chapter
•
The second aspect of France's defense policy is the
alliance* De Gaulle has stated that he wants to maintain it
for as long as the Soviet threat to the world remains* He
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"indispensable" to France's survival. He reiterated this
same sentiment in his July, 1963, press conference* The
form, however, which the alliance adopted in 1949 and the
early 1950' s, does not appear to him to be adapted to pres-
ent circumstances and needs.
In the wake of the problems created by the clearly-
stated French position in January, 1963, M. Alphand summed
up France * s political hopes with a word of caution *
In recent months France has been criticised vio-
lently not only because of her stand on military
strategy but also because of her European policy.
It is Important that the allies of France be accu-
rately Informed* about her intentions and goals in
'I i i » *' •«»•«—••»»» i i ii mmmmmm* i n m i in n i i i i ii ii I mm
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III. THE FORCE D£ FRAFPE
In December, 1960, the French government enacted its
first five-year military program, the central feature of
which was the creation of the Force de Frappe . This measure
provided for the expenditure over a period, 1960-1964, of
more than fc350 million for research in the field of nuclear
weapons production, fc60 million for a strategic bomber force,
23
and 1.90 million for ballistic missile research. (This
22Ibid ., p. 24. [Author's italics.]
23
"The French Nuclear Striking Force," World Today
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cost figure was later revised to between nine and ten bil-
lion new francs or about two billion dollars).
From September until December, I960, Michael Debre
used his full powers of persuasion and coercion to push
through the French legislature appropriations for an ex-
panded military establishment in which funds for the contro-
versial Force de Frappe were included* So strong was the
opposition to the economic consequences of the program and
the burden that it would place upon the French economy, that
a motion for censure of the government's policy in July,
1962, over the increased costs of the program, fell just
thirty-five votes short of achieving the necessary two-
24thirds majority to topple the government*
France *s independent nuclear force program was organ-
ized in two parts. The first objective was to achieve a
first generation force based upon fission (atomic) weapons
in the lower kiloton ranges, the prototype of which was
tested in May, 1962. These weapons, it was planned, would
be delivered by a fleet of Mirage IV supersonic medium-range
bombers. The French have exploded six atomic devices in their
test program, and it was hoped that these weapons would be
operational in late 1963, by which time the production
24
"modernising French Defense," The Economist , CCIV










of the Mirage IV bombers would have begun* This is for the
French their "interim system."
The second generation force will take shape in the
replacement of the bomber delivery mode with their atomic
weapons by a force of intermediate-range ballistic missiles
(IRBM'5) carrying nuclear warheads* The second part of this
program is expected to be ready by 1970*
Perhaps it should be emphasized here that the desire
of de Gaulle to create an independent nuclear retaliatory
force for France is not an attempt to either weaken NATO or
withdraw from the alliance* M. Debre, during the debate in
the French Parliament over the Force de Frappe said, "The
Western alliance must be maintained and developed* It is
essential to the security of Europe and, consequently, of
France."
It would appear that de Gaulle not only wants, but at
this time needs, the continuance of the alliance to insure
America's commitment to Western European defense while
France continues to develop her own independent nuclear
capability and pursue her own national interests* In the
past, the alliance has served to permit France to develop
: economy while secure under the United States shield.
25Edgar S* Furniss, "De Gaulle's France and NATO: An






She was even able to denude herself of protective forces
while she fought her colonial battles in Indo-China and
Algeria. There is no reason to suspect de Gaulle would want
to rid France of this continued protection while he perfects
his own force, the nucleus of the future Western European
force
•
France is determined to make her own nuclear force,
for as Pierre Messmer, the French Minister of Defense said
last year, "there is no defense possible without nuclear
arras."
This decision to create her own nuclear force does
not imply a lack of confidence in the present United abates
commitment to defend Western Europe with nuclear arms,
though there is some doubt expressed, especially by de
Gaulle, about future American resolve. France realizes that
there is a ^reat disparity between the power possessed by
American nuclear forces and that which the French hope to
bring into being. They realize that France needs the U. S.
commitment at this time, for the French force when it does
come into existence will not be able to compare favorably
with either the United States or the Soviet Union for some
time to come, if ever. But as M. Messmer pointed out, "what
26
"Why a U. S. Ally Insists on Its Own Nuclear
Forces," U.S. News and World Report , LIII (September 24,















we also know is that American nuclear arms both strategic
and tactical, are now and will remain at the sole disposi-
27tion of the President of the United States • "
There are two basic reasons for the French develop-
ment of their Force de i?rappe , one is political and the
other military.
The political basis rests upon the present nature and
structure of the NATO alliance which institutionalizes
United States superiority in the military sphere because of
our nuclear monopoly in the West. The NATO structure, pain-
stakingly built up from trial and error, has come down
relatively unchanged since the early period of NATO integra-
tion and today implies no real change in the p relation-
ships between the United States and Europe.
The Europeans feel they are equals with the United
States in lefense of the North Atlantic Area and as
equals they have a desire to share in the decisions affect-
ing the West's deterrent.
On the military level, the Force de Frappe rests on
the nuclear balance existent between the U. S. and the
U.S.S.R. When America had a world monopoly in nuclear
weapons, then the Europeans felt secure behind our strategic





rockets, there is real concern that the United States would
risk attack to defend Europe. Self-preservation is a power-
ful Influencing factor and as de Gaulle has pointed out on
many occasions, Europe cannot be sure the United States will
go on forever suffering the risk of nuclear retaliation in
defense of Europe* "No matter how strong the links of
friendship which bind us to the U. 3., and despite the com-
mon interests we share, we cannot put our national defense
in the hands of the United States indefinitely."
American protestations to the contrary, our guarantee
to Europe requires an act of faith on the part of the Euro-
peans which they may understandably not be able to sustain
forever. We have . tated in effect that France must place
her trust in us for an indefinite period for her nuclear
force is unnecessary and inimical to the NATO alliance.
As late as July, 1963, de Gaulle in his press confer-
ence stated that France must have her own force because the
United States has lost its monopoly on nuclear armament and
because the Soviets possess great destructive power. It is
only natural for the "Americans" to view their own survival
as the principal objective of an eventual conflict with the
East.









Just ft military weapon but a political one as well* He
realized in the 1930' s, when he advocated a need for tanks,
that they were a political as well as a military weapon* A
country which possessed solely defensive armaments, such as
France with her Kaginot Line, "no longer possesses any diplo-
29
matic weapon with which to confront a potential adversary.
"
The humiliation of the British and French at Munich con-
firmed his thesis. France because of her concentration upon
a defensive policy and defensive armaments could only bring
force to bear upon Hitler not to attack her. She was unable
to exert any real pressure to dissuade Hitler, politically
or militarily, from attacking Czechoslovakia or any other
state. She truly lacked offensive power*
Today, the ultimate offensive weapon is nuclear*
French diplomacy must therefore be backed by a French
nuclear force* There can be no political independence
without military independence, and political inde-
pendence is a prerequisite for national ambition. 30
De Gaulle, in his drive toward achieving political
independence through an independent nuclear force, has re-
vealed by his move all the old resentments and forced Europe,
as an entity, to reconsider all the old policies of the past
29Alfred Grosser, "General De Gaulle and the Foreign





which have been accepted until recently as the "givens" in
the alliance relationships. He has raised, too, the question
of whether U. S. nuclear policies are not aimed at maintain-
ing U. S. nuclear monopoly in the alliance and, thus, at
perpetuation of U, S. political dominance in Europe.
Oe Gaulle has cautioned Europe that she must look to
the day when she will have to be able to protect herself and
her own interests. Europe cannot forever rely upon America
or anyone else to carry out this task. It is to one day
fill Europe's need that de Gaulle* s Force de Frappe is aimed.

CHAPTER IV
UNITED STATES ALLIANCE POLICY AND DE GAULLE
The Second World War left the nation-states of West-
ern Europe not only physically weak but also emotionally
drained and lethargic. They were incapable of any real con-
structive efforts or actions which, for a while, created a
serious vacuum. Into this political vacuum, the United
States was "thrust , " by virtue of her immense potential and
real power, as the defender of the free world. After thJLs,
there was no real sovereignty for the states of Western
Europe, except in the most formal sense, for they had to
abdicate what control they had exercised in the past over
their destiny, their defense, and even over their diplomacy
to the United States. This was not a voluntary action but
an "inescapable condition of Europe's postwar weakness • "
This was the period in which American interests in areas of
defense and cold-war policy began to exert a great influence
upon her European allies.
With the political and economic resurgence of Western
Europe, the imbalance which was Inherent and accepted in the
relationship between the United States and Europe, the
Ronald Steel, "The Vanishing Deterrent," The New




. : : ,: I ft(
OS •fti&ft^ftb
ill .•"• ; -'•" \-\. <-:-
73
powerful defender and the weak defended, resulted in a de-
mand by the latter for a larger voice in their own destiny.
This was to be expected sooner or later for there no longer
existed the conditions which made the relationship so vital
in 1949. There now occurred a disturbance in the pattern of
relations which many in the United States had come to regard
almost as permanent*
The most vocal of the protestations made on Europe*
s
behalf have been made by President de Gaulle, whose press
conference of January 14, 1963, was the most challenging to
the alliance. The Atlantic alliance, after his pronounce-
ments in January, 1963, moved from an atmosphere of stupor
to one of convulsive shock.
As France relates her policies toward Europe and the
alliance in terms of the political and military, NATO re-
flects just such military and political divergencies within
the alliance and in Europe. As a military alliance, NATO
has striven to protect Western Europe against the Soviet
threat of aggression. This has remained its program, rela-
tively unchanged since the early days of force integration
in the 1950 's. The problems which plague the alliance in
this military area are more of "how" than of "why," of means
rather than of ends.
There is also NATO the political coalition in which
there has been scarcely one subject upon which all the
-a * iK- .. .
-
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members have been in agreement* At times, it is difficult
to determine when a problem in one area, the military,
crosses over and becomes a complicating factor in the find-
ing of a solution in another area, the political. The
search for sensible solutions to the alliance's military
problems are more often than not bound to complicate the
achievement of solutions for the alliance's political diffi-
culties.
I. U.S. NATO NUCLEAR POLICY - 1960 »S
The revision of the United States Defense budget,
which President Kennedy sent to Congress in March, 1961,
embodied what appeared to many Europeans as a decisive
change from the previously-endorsed doctrine of "massive
retaliation." It was seen in Europe as a strategic retreat
from the proposal for a NATO deterrent force suggested by
2President Eisenhower in I960. The American Strategic Air
Command (SAC) was believed to be the chief deterrent still
against a Soviet attack, but it was now coupled with the
"new" concept of beefing up and expanding the conventional
European forces to guard against thrusts on a scale just
below the use of nuclear weapons. Nuclear retaliation by
1961), 103.
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the United States would come only in extremis because of the
great threat posed by the Soviet nuclear capability which
was aimed at United States cities.
The proposal for NATO to obtain nuclear weapons under
NATO control was first voiced by General Lauris Norstad, the
Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) at the Sixth
Annual NATO Parliamentarians Conference in Paris in November,
3
I960. In this proposal, General Norstad called for a pool
of nuclear weapons to be placed at the disposal of NATO and
under NATO's political control. This was subsequently inter-
preted by the British as meaning there would be fifteen
fingers on the NATO nuclear trigger, in which situation
twelve or thirteen fingers would be able to overcome, by
exerting combined pressure, those dissenting two or three
members against its use. The French, on the other hand, saw
in this fifteen fingers on the safety catch in which case
only one catch need be activated to nullify the weapon's use.
Paul Henri Spaak, the Secretary General of NATO, saw
in his backing of the Norstad proposal a panacea for NATO's
ills. He believed that it would solve the problems of those
countries wishing to possess nuclear arms, provide the
alliance with an efficient means of defense, and contribute
to the cohesion of the alliance psychologically.
3
"NATO Parliamentarians Conference - Crisis of






The eleventh Annual Ministerial Council Review in
Paris, December 16-18, I960, saw the formal United States
presentation of General Norstad's plan. Secretary of State,
Christian A. Herter, put forth the new concept which in-
cluded an offer of five ballistic missile submarines for
NATO with their complement of eighty Polaris missiles, by the
end of 1963. He proposed also that NATO discuss a multi-
lateral system for political control of the missile's
nuclear weapons and suggested that the other NATO members,
as their quid pro quo , contribute another one hundred more
missiles to the NATO force which would be bought in the
United States. 4
These proposals, made under the Eisenhower adminis-
tration, were not in line with the Kennedy advisors' concept
of centralization and control of the West's nuclear deter-
rent. President Kennedy seemed reluctant to furnish a
Polaris deterrent force to NATO, and the plan fell through
5
at the Oslo Ministerial meeting of May 8-10, 1961. Offi-
cially, the United States was prepared, in an announcement
made by the United States Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, to
commit five U.S. Polaris submarines to the forces assigned
4News item in The New York Times , December 17, 18,
and 19, 1960. Also see The Times LLondon ] , December 17, 18,
and 19, 1960.
5
"International Organizations : Summary of Activities •
NATO," International Organization , XV (Summer, 1961), 524-526,




to NATO. The plan, however, since it was contingent upon
the Europeans buying one hundred missiles for NATO in the
United States, was rejected as being too costly. Doubts had
also been expressed concerning the feasibility of political
control over such a force* It was realized that, under the
statutory limitations then in existence, ultimate control
over the nuclear warheads of such a force would revert to
the President of the United States*
President Kennedy referred to this NATO force in his
speech before the Canadian Parliament on May 17, 1962, but
it appeared plain that the initiative for bringing the force
into being would have to come from the Europeans*
We look to the possibility of eventually estab-
lishing a NATO seaborne force, which would be truly
multilateral in ownership and control, if this
should be desired and found feasible by our allies ,
once NATO » s nonnuclear qoalsHriave been achieved ,
b
The lack of a nuclear force for NATO meant that there
would have to be a corresponding increase in men and conven-
tional weapons to meet the new concept of expanded conven-
tional forces to deter any aggressive moves short of total
nuclear war* This resulted, in turn, in political complica-
tions as to which countries should furnish the additional
men and who should pay for what proportion of the rising
c
"The Common Aims of Canada and the United States,"







costs in maintaining the alliance forces* At the same time,
it led to the larger political implication of lessening, in
the long run, the United States credibility to use its
nuclear weapons to defend Europe. The ever-tightening con-
trol desired by the United States over the West*s deterrent
forces increased the tempo for independent nuclear forces
within the alliance to offset the gaps which the Europeans
felt were being created by American policies* Furthermore,
the U.S. proposal to place Polaris submarines under NATO
control really did not go very far in satisfying European
and French desires for an adequate voice in the policy deci-
sions affecting the West's nuclear forces* The Polaris sub-
marines to be lent to NATO would be in the same category as
United States forces committed to NATO, but would coordinate
with NATO strategy and with the non-NATO United States
forces* In other words, "under the arrangements that we
have in force, American warheads remain in American cus-
tody." 7
American policy, as advocated by Secretary of Defense
McNamara, was clearly shown in his speech at Ann Arbor,
Michigan, on June 16, 1962* The American concept of
"Secretary Rusk Attends CENTO, NATO, and ANZUS
Meetings" (CBS interview with Secretary of State Rusk, May
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counterforce strategy was that
. • . principal military objectives, in the event of
a nuclear war stemming from a major attack on the
alliance, should be in the destruction of the enemy's
military forces, not of his civilian population .8
This policy meant that nuclear forces would only possess the
power of deterrence if they were large and powerful enough
to undertake the task of acting as a counterforce* Such a
requirement in the West's defensive potential could only be
met by the United States capability; therefore, all national
nuclear forces were unnecessary, expensive, not credible,
and injurious to the alliance.
In particular, relatively weak national nuclear
forces with enemy cities as their targets are not
likely to be sufficient to perform even the function
of deterrence.
In short, then, limited nuclear capabilities, oper-
ating independently, are dangerous, expensive, prone
to obsolescence, and lacking in credibility as a
deterrent* Clearly, the United States nuclear con-
tribution to the alliance is neither obsolete nor
dispensable*
At the same time, the general strategy I have sum-
marized magnifies the importance of unity of planning,
concentration of executive authority, and central
direction*
^
In an attempt to dissuade the Europeans, particularly
the French, from constructing their own independent nuclear
Q
"Defense Arrangements of the North Atlantic Com-








forces, the United States built up elaborate and formidable
technical arguments. The McNamara speech was one of the
methods by which our views on this were made clear to the
Europeans,
The emphasis placed by the United States upon the
doctrine of counterforce was also designed to convince the
Europeans that the quest for nuclear independence was not
possible, because to support such a doctrine required a
large massive nuclear arsenal which the Europeans did not
possess. While the new doctrine, it was hoped, would soothe
the fears of the Europeans, it had just the opposite affect*
It seemed reasonable to the Europeans that the latest United
States strategy was designed with the idea, at least in
part, of insuring its permanent nuclear monopoly in the
alliance.
The fade-out of counterforce theory came with the
hardening of the Soviet missile sites and the construction
by the U.S.S.R. of a force of missile launching submarines.
The nuclear stalemate which resulted between the U.S. and
the U.S.S.R. seemed to have made total war between the two
irrational and this, in turn, has led to larger European
demand for a more credible deterrent, at least one they
could believe in—and this meant one of their own which they
could count upon at all times and under all circumstances.




Joint command and integrated forces for NATO were fully
acceptable to most of the Europeans. They were willing to
limit or even abrogate their sovereignty to the extent which
was necessary for this centralization of command. In reality
this could only have been an American one. So long as they
felt safe under the benevolent protection of our nuclear
"umbrella, H there was no great quarrel with the system.
Today, the situation has taken a different turn with
the increasing uncertainty of whether the United States
would use its nuclear power to defend Europe in spite of the
Soviet rocket threat. "Fears of American reluctance to
incinerate themselves in the cause of European freedom are
not new." The Europeans are not quick to forget that it
was our Secretary of State, Christian Herter, who in a
statement before the United States Foreign Relations Commit-
tee on April 21, 1959, said, "I cannot conceive of any
President engaging in all-out nuclear war unless we were in
danger of all-out devastation ourselves .
"
The Europeans felt, furthermore, that if the United
States did have an invulnerable second-strike capability,
whether counterforce or counterstrike, we might possibly
Editorial in The Times [London], January 5, 1962.
George Lichtheim, The New Europe Today - and Tomor-




write off our military commitments to Europe rather than
permit ourselves at some future time to be placed at the
12
mercy of our allies* precipitous actions.
Then, there is the ever"-changing international situa-
tion which, as K. Herve Alphand stated, may in five, ten, or
even fifteen years from now be so altered that French na-
tional interests may find themselves threatened, but not
13those of her allies. This can easily be turned around to
mean that, at some future time, the interests of the allies,
particularly the United States, may not coincide with those
of France. If this should become the case, then the French
must obtain a nuclear force to enable them to speak with a
"voice" that will be heard in the councils of the super-
powers regardless of the action which her allies will take.
Against such hoped-for political gains, the technical argu-
ments advanced by the United States against independent
nuclear forces on the military level were irrelevant to
de Gaulle.
The existence of the "special relationship" which
developed between Great Britain and the United States, and
which grew in the area of sharing nuclear material and
12Ibld ., p. 31-32.









information, was made more binding by the enactment of the
MacWahon Act. The French interpreted this statute as being
specifically designed to aid Great Britain and keep France
out of the circle of nuclear powers in the alliance.
The United States justified its action in not taking
France into the "special relationship" as we did Great
Britain, because of her poor security system and because of
the specific requirements laid down by the Congress. The
amendment to the Atomic Energy Act stated, in effect, that
information and materials in connection with the design and
manufacture of atomic weapons could be given only to those
nations which had convinced the United States that they had
made substantial progress in manufacturing this type of
weapon. The French were quick to understand the implica-
tions of this—the key to parity with the United Kingdom in
the Western alliance lay in the development of a national
atomic program. Later, however, after she had achieved her
successful test explosion in the Sahara, she found that she
was still no closer to achieving a privileged status. The
United States was as adamant as ever about sharing her
secrets with France. The United States argument took the
form now of wanting to prevent the proliferation of atomic
weapons and for this reason saw fit to deny France informa-
tion which would prove of vast aid to her in the development








Even after the passage of an American-French nuclear
agreement in 1961, the United States found ways to avoid
supplying information and materials to establish a force
14
which would be "inimical" to the alliance. Article I,
"General Provisions , " of the Agreement is so worded that it
conforms with the security provisions of the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954 (Sections 91c and 144b), which leaves a con-
siderable amount of room for the Party transferring informa-
tion, 15
Article I is set forth as follows:
While the united States and France are participat-
ing in an international arrangement for their mutual
defense and security and making substantial and
material contributions thereto, each Party will com-
municate to and exchange with the other Party infor-
mation and transfer non-nuclear parts of atomic
weapons systems involving Restricted Data to the
other Party in accordance with the provisions of this
Agreement, provided that the communicating or trans-
ferring Party determines that such cooperation wiTT
t
romote and will not constitute an unreasonable"
*
rTsk
o its defense and security . -iS""*
Thus, there exists a statutory means of providing
France with the information which would make her task, in
14The "Agreement for Cooperation in the Operation of
Atomic Systems for Mutual Defense Purposes," was signed in
Paris on July 27, 1961, and entered into force on October 9,
1961; Department of State Bulletin , XLV (October 30, 1961),
733.






constructing a nuclear force, easier and much less expen-
sive. It has not been United States policy, however, to so
implement the provisions of the agreement.
Concerning the seemingly-ambiguous policy pursued by
the United States toward Great Britain and France in rela-
tion to the establishment of independent nuclear forces
,
K. Alphand asked a question to which many have sought the
answer: "Why should a policy be considered reasonable when
it is Britain's policy and dangerous or ridiculous when it
17becomes the policy of France ?•
II. THE NASSAU AGREEMENT
The meeting between President Kennedy and Prime
Minister Macmillan at Nassau in the Bahamas on December 19-
21, 1962, saw a greater change in the NATO alliance and the
U.S.-British special relationship, than had occurred since
1956 at Suez. Far more was at stake than the obvious dis-
cussion of Skybolt. To the British, the conference was
greeted as no less than an all-out attempt to reduce the
independent nuclear power of Great Britain. It seemed to
them an all too logical follow-up in the light of Defense
Secretary McNamara's statements at Ann Arbor six months
earlier. While the Defense Secretary explained shortly
17
' Alphand, loc . cit.
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after his speech that- he had not intended to include Great
Britain in his remarks against those states with "limited
nuclear capabilities," there was little doubt, especially
after the conference, that Great Britain was just as much a
target as France.
The United States policy toward the alliance in
regard to nuclear weapons was most clearly revealed at
Nassau, where our "anti-proliferation" policy was at its
zenith. Since we felt unable to extend to France the "spe-
cial status" we had given to the British, we went a long way
toward meeting French objections by greatly abrogating Great
Britain* s independent nuclear potential. The agreement at
Nassau seemed to indicate that "continuance of special
18
status for Britain now is undesirable."
By pleading increasing costs and technical difficul-
ties in the development of the Skybolt missile, which
problems became readily apparent shortly after we talked
Great Britain into the Skybolt project and abandoning her
Blue Streak missile, we managed to cancel, to a great extent,
the last remnant of exclusive British control over their
nuclear force. A working Skybolt, which would have been
capable of being launched from a bomber of the British "V"
18Malcolm W. Hoag, "Nuclear Policy and French Intran-
sigence," ForeJLoji M^airs, 41 (January, 1963), 290.
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Bomber Force, would have supplied the British with an inde-
pendent deterrent free from U.S. control. But with the can-
cellation of the Blue Streak and concentration upon the
Skybolt, the British had pinned all their hopes for retain-
ing an independent force upon American ability and willing-
ness to develop Skybolt. The cancellation of the Skybolt
project by the United States and the inability of the
British to continue with the project independently left the
British no alternative but to accept the American counter-
proposal for a seaborne force of Polaris missiles and ships*
These would be deployed and "targeted" in agreement with the
United States, which would give the United States a greater
measure of control over Great Britain^ nuclear deterrent
than was ever enjoyed over the "V" Bomber Force. The British
reaction was extremely bitter against this inescapable fact.
The plain truth is that during the last fortnight
Britain has suffered a crushing politico-military
defeat which has revealed our real weakness even more
pointedly than at Suez. For we have been obliged, at
pistol point, to carry out a fundamental reorganiza-
tion of our basic defence policies in a matter of 43
hours, as the result of a single administrative deci-
sion taken in Washington. 19
In addition to restructuring the role of Britain as a
nuclear power within the alliance, the Skybolt cancellation
was also a financial windfall. While the United States was
19
"The Vanishing Deterrent," New Statesman , LXIV




given more de facto control over the British deterrent, at no
real cost to the United States, the development cost of Sky-
bolt was saved and this was expected to exceed $2.5 billion.
At the same time, as the United States was pushing its anti-
proliferation and centralization of control upon a reluctant
British government, it was reactivating the long-quiescent
Eisenhower-Norstad proposal for a NATO seaborne force. By
offering to the French the same proposal which we offered
Great Britain, we hoped to appease some of de Gaulle* s cri-
ticisms by showing him that now France and Great Britain were
equals. There was now, in fact, no "special-relationship."
The United Kingdom had an "ace-in-the-hole" which she
chose not to play, much to de Gaulle *s disdain, and this was
the possibility of turning away from her relationship with
the United States and bringing her own nuclear force into
Europe. This force, when merged with the French, would form
the nucleus of a true "third force" in Western Europe. It
is interesting that just such ideas began to be hinted by
the British in coincidence with doubts, expressed and im-
plied, by the United States over the merits of the Skybolt
system. The New York Times carried a story in which it was
reported that "the British Government now believes in the
20
establishment of a European nuclear deterrent."
20Drew Middleton, "Britain Supports New Atom Force for




The result which this had upon United States offi-
cials was observed at the NATO Council meeting in December,
at which time it was reported that:
There are signs, however, that they may be con-
cerned about the effect of leaving Britain entirely
without a role in the nuclear deterrent strategy;
this it is felt may drive Britain into some sort of
close association with France in the development of
ballistic missiles. 21
Nothing came of these fears on the part of United
States officials as Great Britain chose to remain in close
relationship with the United States despite what it might
cost her. On December 18, 1962, Mr* Thorneycroft , in a
House of Commons speech, tried to prepare for the inevitable
when he voiced his doubts on the feasibility and costs of
Skybolt. He made mention of the fact that it was not devel-
oping as was hoped and would be delayed in reaching the
operational stage* There was an alternative which might be
22had and would be more accurate, the Polaris missile* This
was what was obtained at Nassau* The story, as carried in
The Times on December 22, 1962, made it appear as if it was
a victory for the Macmillan government* "Mr. Macmillan




News item in The Times [London], December 13, 1962.
Ibid., December 18, 1962.
i
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As far as da Gaulle was concerned, the Nassau agree-
ment only proved further his thesis that Great Britain was
just acting as an agent for United States policy in Europe.
Under the circumstances, it appeared not too illogical an
assumption.
Regarding the American proposal for a multilateral
nuclear force with French participation, de Gaulle, as ex-
pected, rejected it upon grounds which were familiar to all
within the alliance. As Pierre Messraer had stated, the con-
cept of a NATO nuclear force had been under discussion ever
since its proposal at the NATO Ministerial meeting in 1960.
Since then, all the speeches, conferences, and statements
have led nowhere. "They cannot lead anywhere as long as the
United States refuses to give up its absolute control over
24
nuclear weapons."
The technical reason for the French rejection of the
nuclear force was that if she were to buy Polaris missiles
from the United States, she was not absolutely certain that
she would be able to build the warheads to fit them or the
submarines to launch them. In addition, such a purchase
would hit the relatively new French aero-space industry in a
strategic place, its finances.
24









The political reasons were, perhaps, better known if
not completely understood. To accept the American offer
would mean that France would either have to construct a
duplicate force for NATO use while building her own independ-
ent deterrent or completely place her nuclear arms under
NATO control* The former was an absolute financial impos-
sibility, for France was finding the financial going diffi-
cult in building her force* The latter was just as
impossible for it went against the Gaullist policy of inde-
pendence from America and her principle of obtaining her own
completely independent deterrent force.
The French, thus, viewed the activities at Nassau as
but another United States maneuver to place France and
Europe in a permanent position of inferiority to the United
States and, in this, they saw Great Britain as the accom-
plice of the United States. The entry of Great Britain,
especially after Nassau, into the Common Market was viewed
as the vehicle by which America would try to exert its influ-
ence in the EEC, with the hope of eventually subverting it
to the status of an economic satellite.
The French find it difficult to understand why the
United States, which was before Nassau only lukewarm on the
multilateral force idea, did an about-face in trying to sell





previously stated that the alliance has no urgent need for a
European contribution in nuclear forces.
Insistence by the United States upon a nuclear
monopoly has not acted as a brake upon proliferation. It
implies strongly, as Secretary McNamara stated, that only
the "right" people should have them and control them* The
mistrust shown Europe by the United States has been recipro-
cated by President de Gaulle, who has said that in the end
Europe can depend only on herself and not others for aid*
Since a NATO nuclear force can add but little to the
West's overall deterrent, mainly because of America's great
arsenal of nuclear weapons, then the onx/ reason for advo-
cating such a force on the part of the U. S. must be politi-
cal* By this means, the United States hopes to allay the
European critics of U.S. NATO policy and nuclear monopoly,
and to give them a larger voice in this area. However, de
Gaulle knows as well as we do that a real voice in these
matters cannot come until the Europeans are permitted to
have a real say in when the missiles are to be launched, if
ever. This can never come about under present statutory
limitations, and de Gaulle knows this also. Therefore, all
our efforts in this direction will be for naught because
they do not really meet the requirements of the Europeans.
-r.*






III. THE BRUSSELS BREAKDOWN
The breakdown In the Brussels negotiations on the
British Government's bid for admission to the Community of
the Six would have been somewhat anti-climatic had it not
been for the dramatic and brutal way President de Gaulle
ended the talks. While there were many who criticized the
manner in which the talks were halted, it did make for a
clean break, "and a clean break was what everybody was pray-
ing for in those final weeks, not a fuzzy epilogue stained
25
with tears and jejune funeral orations." Despite the
British assertions to the contrary, the talks at Brussels
had not been getting on very well and were not as certain of
success as many were led to believe. Further, the "Five"
were not consistently siding with the British against the
French during the negotiations.
The news conference of January 14, 1963, made it
clear that the French rejection of the British application
for membership into the EEC was, in a large measure, based
upon de Gaulle's belief that Great Britain was tied too
close to the United States and, for this reason, was not
"truly" European. The rejection was also a Gaullist re-
action to what were supposedly United States policies
25Thomas Barman, "Behind the Brussels Breakdown,"
International Affairs, 39 (July, 1963), 363.
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directed at subverting the European Community to conform to
American interests* Oe Gaulle has, for a long period, be-
lieved that American "prodding" of the British to become a
part of the "new" Europe, was solely to gain a foothold in
the Community and thereby prevent the development of inde-
26pendent European diplomacy* De Gaulle feared that Britain
in the Common Market would represent an American "Trojan
Horse" with all the attendant disruptive consequences that
could be expected as the result of this maneuver*
Great Britain's acquiescence to United States blandish-
ments, arguments, and "take it or leave it" proposal at
Nassau, firmed de Gaulle's resolve not to admit Great Britain
into the EEC* Had Great Britain used her option and made
the "correct" choice, severed her special ties with the
United States, and brought her "V" Bombers and nuclear know-
how to Europe, de Gaulle would have looked upon British
entry in a different light . As it was, Great Britain, by
permitting a vital attribute of her national sovereignty—
her nuclear deterrent—to become dependent upon the United
States, had made the "wrong" choice. Great Britain, in
maintaining her ties with the United States, disqualified
27herself as a European power.
26Ronald Steel, "The General's European Campaign,"
The New Leader , XLVI (February 4, 1963), 15*
27Edmond Taylor, "After Brussels," The Reporter , 28
(February 14, 1963), 29.
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During the Cuban confrontation, de Gaulle received
several reports from French intelligence sources that, in
secret talks and communications between Washington and the
Kremlin, President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev were in
substantial agreement over such issues as Berlin, U. S. mis*
sile bases in Italy and Turkey, and a nuclear test ban.
De Gaulle believed that any agreements which would arise
from these secret negotiations and to which he was not a
party, would be at the expense of Western Europe and
28France.
Prodded by his desire not to be faced with a fait
accompli by the super-powers and his very real apprehension
over further American incursions into Europe economically,
he acted faster than he had planned. De Gaulle believed
that since Great Britain had shown she was acting as a U.S.
puppet, that he and France were the only ones to prevent
Europe from being crushed by agreements between the two very
29great powers. With this as the background for his precipi-
tous action in intervening in the Brussels talks, de Gaulle
hoped to gain more, in the long run, than he lost, especially
George W. Herald, "Charles DeGaulle's Abstractions,"
The New Leader , XLVI (February 18, 1963), 14.
29Alastair Buchan, NATO in the 1960*8 , The Impllca-






in regard to the other members of the SEC whom he had no
time to consult*
The test ban that came to fruition In the summer of
1963 and which de Gaulle rejected supported his previous
intelligence information, but it did not change his attitude.
"France will not be diverted by the Moscow agreements from
equipping herself with the means of immeasurable destruction
30possessed by the other powers." The test ban appears to
de Gaulle as a prelude to greater negotiations covering
other areas "notably European questions" which in the ab-
31
sence of the Europeans "runs counter to the view of France*"
De Gaulle has achieved his purpose, for the time
being at least, by denying Great Britain membership in the
European Community* It remains to be seen just how long he
can hold to this position in the face of European opposition
to his policy* The time table for the aging President is
growing short* He must consolidate his position for France
in Europe before the EEC switches over to a majority vote
in 1966.
30Press Conference of President de Gaulle in The New




DE GAULLE'S POLICIES AND NATO
Possibly the greatest single effect which the poli-
cies of Prance under de Gaulle's leadership have produced is
a new awareness of the changed nature of old relationships
within the alliance* The French President's remarks of
January 14, 1963, indicated more clearly than every before
that the Europeans desired these changes to be recognized
and understood by the United States. The relationships
which had existed when NATO became an integrated politico-
military alliance had become altered over the years. The
situation which made the commitment of the United States to
Western Europe's defense in peacetime had also changed.
France, as the leader of the movement in the "new" Europe,
gave voice to this undercurrent of European feeling; Europe
has a right to a greater voice in matters affecting her
future destiny and in the control of those forces which
could involve the constituent states of Europe. In such an
eventuality as a conflict between the two great nuclear
powers, Europe could conceivably find herself crushed between
two great wills.
I. THE CHANGED SITUATION






of urgency, no feeling of fear or uncertainty which marked
the 1949 period when NATO was brought into existence by a
common need felt on both sides of the Atlantic* In this
period, Western Europe needed the benefits accruing from a
United States guarantee of their security, not only in the
military-defense sphere, but also economically and psycho-
logically as well* Under this protective "umbrella" of
American deterrent forces and benevolent but absolute leader-
ship, the Europeans were able to throw off their lethargy
and prosper.
In 1949 and the early 1950 » s, the Soviet threat seemed
most great in military terms. It was not too difficult to
envision a hoard of Soviet tanks rolling Westward* Today
the Soviet threat or challenge is in the field of economics
and technology* The area of the Soviet menace is now re-
moved from Western Europe and is centered in Southeast Asia*
Also, in the •49- , 50 period, the United States had a world-
wide monopoly of atomic weapons which it could use, if need
arose, in defense of its allies without fear of retaliation*
Today, with the possession of mass destruction weapons by
the U.S.S.R., there is considerable doubt expressed as to
whether the U.S. would risk her own destruction in defense
of Western Europe* All of these problems and changes in the
international situation have led to an erosion in NATO's




strength and resoluteness* The emphasis placed upon conven-
tional arms for the defense of Western Europe in the 1960 *s
does not in the least increase this "resoluteness" on the
part of America *s allies.
Today, Western Europe is physically capable and
economically sound enough to be able to provide for her own
conventional defense. What appears to be lacking is the
ability and willingness to accept a greater share of the
burden for her own defense under the present organization.
NATO, in spite of the United States balance of payments
deficit. The United States appears not to comprehend the
Europeans' desire to want to be able to look after their own
defense or their motives for this.
There is in Europe a curious mixture of this desire
to take care of themselves coupled with an inordinate lack
of enthusiastic support for large or expanded military ef-
forts. In a report prepared for the U.S. Foreign Service
Institute in I960, it was stated that, except for Britain
and Denmark, there was a large amount of "egocentricity" in
Europe. When extended to worldwide problems and the cold
war confrontation between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., the
Europeans were generally "unwilling to accept either a
passive role on the one hand or on the other the responsi-
bility for working with the United States in meeting Soviet




attacks elsewhere." In the main, their concern lay with
their own particular problems. When their interests did
fall outside Europe it usually lay "exclusively in areas of
their respective former of [sic ] present colonial holdings."
But there is in Europe an understanding that Europe
has the capabilities to do more in its own behalf than It
has in the past. It is in no small measure due to de Gaulle
that Western Europe is becoming more concerned about its
future under United States protection, and is looking for a
greater measure of security closer to home. This, as de
Gaulle has said many times, can only come from within*
Europe must one day look to the time when she must furnish
her own defenses, conventional and nuclear, and cease her
reliance upon non-European powers.
II. UNITED STATES COMMITMENT TO EUROPE
The United States commitment to the defense of
Western Europe, as expressed in the NATO Pact, has been, and
for the foreseeable future will continue to be, irrevocable*
There is no reason to believe that this commitment will be
adversly affected by de Gaulle's attitude toward the alliance
Allan Crockett, et al. , Report of Study Group on
Problems of European Securi'ly , United S*Eates Foreign Service






and American leadership. While the substance of the U.S.
commitment will endure, the form may take a different road
than in the past. In this area, United States policies may
be strongly affected by Gaullist actions and attitudes. The
day may soon come when, because of some external though re-
lated factor, such as the balance of payments deficit, the
United States may want to withdraw a majority of its forces
from Europe. Such a move in the face of de Gaulle 1 a pro-
nouncements that America may not be counted upon for the
defense of Western Europe would be tantamount to admitting
that he was right. It certainly would make the real factors
for such a move almost unexplainable to our allies*
NATO and the United States guarantee which backs it
has served usefully in the past. It has kept Europe secure
from creeping Soviet encroachment in the late 1940* s and
1950 's (though there are those who argue that no such threat
really existed despite the evidence to the contrary), and
permitted the Europeans to develop a more peaceful state of
mind which was certainly conducive to their rapid and
effective recovery. NATO's existence was also a guarantee
to Europe that the New World would aid the Old in peacetime.
As a mutual defense arrangement, NATO is not in dis-
pute in most European countries, save France. Most agree
that so long as there is a possible threat from the Soviet







as a deterrent. Then again, there is just nothing that is
on the scene which would be able to replace it, despite its
drawbacks* The motivating force needed to overcome the in-
ertia which has been built up over the years in the accept-
ance of the alliance simply cannot be generated in the
present world situation to develop a new scheme of alliance.
This is especially true in what would most certainly be an
intransigent French position*
President Kennedy, in regard to expressed European
fears that the United States might some day abandon its com-
mitment to Western Europe, stated:
But I want to emphasize tonight, to all the
peoples of the Western Alliance, that I strongly
believe that such fears are folly* The United
States cannot withdraw from Europe, unless and
until Europe should wish us gone* We cannot dis-
tinguish its defenses from our own* We cannot
diminish our contributions to Western security or
abdicate the responsibilities of power* • • •
And our policies in Europe today are founded on one
deep conviction: that the threat to Western Europe
and freedom is basically indivisible, as is the
Western deterrent to that threat*
The United States, therefore, is committed to
the defense of Europe, by history as well as by
choice * *
This was the theme of President Kennedy *s 1963 visit
to Western Europe* Oe Gaulle accepts President Kennedy's
3
"President Kennedy's Address to National Trade Con-
ference in Washington," U.S. News and or Id Report , LII





statements of good faith but, at the same time, rejects the
idea that the actions of one President will be binding upon
a future American Chief executive. There have been too many
proofs of this in the past, in the change from the strategy
of massive retaliation to expanded conventional forces, and
in the pre-emptory manner in which we canceled Skybolt and
left the British without an independent force* No Arr. irican
President can predict the judgments or changes which his
successors may chose in an era of rapidly-changing and ex-
panding technology and knowledge. For this reason, France
wants her own independent nuclear force. Because "# • «
NATO has been undeniably successful in its role as the major
4
vehicle of the United States presence in Europe," de Gaulle
wants the American (and British) dominance of the alliance
to end and United States influence in Europe to be withdrawn.
The hope which the United States had of broadening
the NATO alliance into areas of greater cooperation by means
of a true Atlantic Partnership fell into abeyance after de
Gaulle 1 s January, 1963, pronouncements. Just as the move-
ment towards greater political federation in Europe had been
brought to a halt by France *s unyielding position, so too
has the concept of broadening the base for greater political








France, neither scheme for greater Interdependence among
nations would be practicable nor workable*
HATO, then, will probably remain primarily a military
alliance until some answers are found to satisfy de Gaulle's
objections. It is not likely then that in the near future
"the community of interest which brought the NATO countries
into a defensive military alliance can be broadened to in-
clude within NATO itself, the conduct of an economic and
5
social counteroffensive," This statement, although set out
in 1960, is as equally valid today.
There is today an improved area of political consul-
tation in NATO, certainly better than that which existed in
1956. However, there is still the feeling that it is more
an exchange of information after the event (as was the case
in the Cuban confrontation), than a joint participation by
all the members in policy decisions of major importance. The
independent action taken unilaterally by the United States
in the Cuban Crisis of 1962 weakened the aura of whatever
political consultation NATO had until then possessed. Great
Britain, France, and Germany all resented, to a certain
extent, the way the United States handled the situation. If
the crisis were as "real" as it was presented, then they all
5Eileen R, Donovan, et al
•
, The Future of NATO : An
Outline of Probable Strengtns" and Weaknesses Oyer the NexT
Ten Years t United States Foreign Service Institute, Senior




risked possible nuclear destruction as a result of American
policy decisions in which they had shared no part, except ex
pose facto . This considerably strengthened those in Surope
who felt fully justified in pursuing their own independent
foreign and defense policies* While the United States may
have really believed that the full revelation of what had
transpired in Cuba would impress our NATO partners and per-
mit us to emphasise the importance of centralized policy
direction and control of the West's nuclear deterrent forces,
it meant to our allies that their acceptance of the American
doctrine meant the end of national nuclear forces. This was
not to be the case, especially in regard to France*
III. FUTURE AFFECTS UPON THE ALLIANCE
It was a fashionable pastime in 1962 to declare the
NATO alliance "dead." Yet, it has endured the severest
strains and survives today despite its critics and its in-
herent faults. The alliance has weathered storms of great
political consequence, fissiparous nationalistic drives, and
monopolistic policy direction. That NATO will continue as a
military alliance seems a reasonable assumption. There is
nothing, now, capable of replacing it and as long as there
is any danger from Soviet Russia and her satellites, some
sort of alliance would seem prudent to serve as a deterrent





to reflect the actual status of Europe's power (and France's)
ir relation to that of the 1949-1950 era would also seem to
be a reasonable assumption*
France Is as much a part of NATO as she is of Western
Europe* Without France there can be no real defense or
organization for the defense of Western Europe* It is un-
thinkable that the other fourteen members of NATO could plan
around French intransigence and ignore her in attempting to
achieve security in Western Europe* As President Kennedy
has stated, Western Europe is vital to United States secu-
rity; therefore* we must maintain and accept France as part
of the alliance*
To acquiesce to some of de Gaulle's demands in regard
to the alliance and permit France to play a greater part in
the NATO structure and policy direction would be a recogni-
tion of her role on the Continent and in the "new" Europe*
It would not be a submission to de Gaulle's will but a recog-
nition instead of the changed nature of relationships among
the members of the alliance*
It is expected that de Gaulle will again renew his
demands and challenge the Anglo-American directorate of the
alliance to grant France substantial revisions in the con-
trol and command structure* Perhaps this time, some of his
points will be granted* There may even be a French General




conference of July 29, 1963
• • • for the French Government, important changes
must be made in the conditions of its means of par-
ticipating in the alliance, for this organization
was built on the basis of integration, which no
longer is of any value for us.®
In line with the French President's greater aims, he
expects and wants American influences out of Europe entirely.
He cannot achieve this by demanding alterations of a mild
nature at this time. However, before 1969 or by date
at the latest, when the NATO Treaty comes up for renewal,
de Gaulle can make his price so high that the alliance will
become invalid* At such time, armed with her own independ-
ent nuclear force, de Gaulle or his successor can try again
for a Franco-Russian alliance in Europe's name. In the
light of the Soviet's growing troubles with China, such an
agreement might be acceptable, especially so if the Euro-
peans are no longer tied to United States policy. Such a
course of action would be conditional upon the failure of
the United States to reach an accommodation with the Soviet
Union before France and Europe have their opportunity to be
heard. Oe Gaulle believes in a detente or an entente which
will bring a refreshing change to East-West relations but
when such a day comes, "France expects to make constructive
Press Conference of President de Gaulle in The Mew





proposals concerning the peace and equilibrium and destiny
7
of Europe* *
Any change in the alliance will, of course, have its
affects upon U.S. forces committed to NATO, especially if
such changes are in the area of Commands. It would be hard
to visualize the United States maintaining our forces in
Western Europe at considerable cost, under a reorganized
NATO structure in which America would have less than a pre-
dominant voice in their use within NATO.
In the area of nuclear weapons development, it ap-
pears that nothing can be done to halt de Gaulle's program
for France, except worldwide disarmament. Until such an
agreement la reached, France will continue to work for an
independent nuclear capability. If the United States were
to offer France the assistance she requires, with no strings
attached, de Gaulle would accept, but he would under no cir-
cumstances abandon his goals for a modicum of aid or even
increased stature in the alliance. As he explained at
Grenoble on October 7, 1960;
France intends that her defence should be national
in character, in particular as far as nuclear weapons
are concerned; France must have her own weapon. If by
misfortune, atomic bombs were to be launched in the
world, France intends that none should be launched
from the side of the free world without her consent.
8
7Ibid.
France and the European Community , Occasional Paper
..
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Oe Gaulle desires that France, then, be consulted in
all matters affecting the West's policies throughout the
world, for he does not want her to be drawn into any situa-
tion against her will which could prove disasterous for her
in its consequences.
In regard to the sharing of information and the giv-
ing of nuclear aid to France, the Foreign Policy Research
Institute of the University of Pennsylvania, in a study pre-
pared for the Committee on Foreign Relations, argued:
The United States should make available to its
principal European allies the appropriate nuclear
capabilities in order to avoid costly duplication
of development effort and the diversion of scarce
resources from the creation of adequate ground
forces.'
A similar study prepared by The Washington Center of Foreign
Policy Research of Johns Hopkins University, agreed that if
her allies are determined to proceed with their own programs,
the United States should provide technical assistance to
avoid costly duplication of effort.
Because independent allied strategic forces can add
little to the deterrent supplied by the U.S. strategic
forces and because they tend to divert allied efforts
from more pressing needs of local defense, the United
No. 11 (London: Political and Economic Planning, 1961),
pp. 14-15.
9United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign
Relations, rn Europe," U.S. Foreign Policy Study No. 2.*
87tt Congress, 1st Session (Washington: Government PrlnTTngT"
Office, 1961), p. 214.
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States should discourage the establishment or exten-
sion of independent nuclear forces* If our allies
cannot be dissuaded from this objective, the United
States should attempt to channel their efforts into
mobile or otherwise protected retaliatory systems.
For this purpose, it would be useful for the United
States to share technical information concerning the
construction of hardened missile sites and solid
missile propellants with its allies. i0
If the United States cannot stop de Gaulle in his bid
for nuclear forces, then it appears that the only alterna-
tive the United States has to attempt to keep it under
control as much as possible and give France the information
we feel we can release without hurting her own security*
Much of the information and assistance we would furnish
France is certainly possessed by the Soviet Union so there
would not appear to be much risk in this direction. Some
means can and should be found to recognize France's role as
the keystone of the NATO alliance on the Continent and the
augmented prestige which she has achieved from her develop-
ment of a nuclear capability unaided.
United States Congress, Senate, Committee on For-
eign Relations, "Developments in Military Technology and
Their Impact on United States Strategy and Foreign Policy,"
ur£. Foreign Policy Study No. 8, 87& Congress, 1st Session
Twashington : Government PrTntTng Office, 1961), p. 681.






France, after the end of World War II, had one pre-
requisite in the pursuit of her foreign policy and that was
the search for recognition of her status as a Great Power by
the victorious allies* Those who directed her course in
international affairs realized that for France to be the
initiator of events and not the victim she had to seek the
status as an equal with the Big Three*
With the split in the wartime alliance among the Big
Powers, France began to take a more important part in the
proceedings of the postwar era in Europe, because both the
East and the West sought her support initially* For a tern-
porary period, at least, France was permitted to nourish her
dream of acting the role of mediator between the forces of
the East and the West which were growing farther apart* The
width of the split that developed, however, forced France to
abandon her idea of acting as the cohesive element in this
divisive postwar period* Gradually she found that it was
not possible to side step the growing conflict between the
two Great Power blocs , and France was forced to choose between
the East and the West for the sake of sheer survival*
During the late 1940*s, French leaders found that
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of adequate national power to support them." The result
was that France, by 1947 and 1948, had come to depend more
and more upon American military and economic aid to make up
for what she lacked and to bolster her internally against
communist machinations, While such aid was needed and, to a
certain extent, greatly appreciated, another side of the
French political personality felt a certain sense of humilia-
tion and loss of pride by virtue of the fact that France was
so dependent. More galling, perhaps, was the fact that her
aid was coming from the "Anglo-Saxons," the only ones which
were capable of meeting France's needs.
In advocating the movement for European unity, France
sought to regain her position as a mediator and retain at
least partial control over a revitalized and economically
resurgent Germany. In this movement, France believed that
she would assume the role of the "natural" leader. France
played a leading role in the development of European insti-
tutions in the economic, political, and military sphere*
This was due, in no small part, to her desire to create
organizations that would be able and strong enough to con-
trol Western Germany.
As part of her security requirements, France, in
Edgar S. Furniss, Jr., France , Troubled Ally ,
DeGaulle's Heritage and Prospects (New York: Frederick A,





company with Great Britain, wanted the United States to be
bound to Western Europe in some type of peacetime military
commitment. The United States reaction to such a proposal
was the same as that embodied in the Marshall Plan offer.
The Europeans were asked first to demonstrate that they not
only were willing to act in their own behalf but were also
ready to accept such a task. Thus, it was that the Brussels
Treaty came into being with its quasi-military organisation
which proved an important first step in paving the way in
the United States for an expanded United States commitment
to Western Europe. The NATO Pact which was the culmination
of this effort emerged a year later in 1949.
On the question of German rearmament, the French were
hard pressed to find an acceptable solution to meet their
security requirements. They were severely pressured by the
United States into accepting the concept of a West German
force as being vital to the defense of Western Europe and,
consequently, France. The Plevan Plan of 1950 was the solu-
tion which the French accepted most readily when the danger
of Soviet aggression seemed so imminent. It was rejected by
the French Parliament in 1954 because of a number of factors
which found the Gaullists and Communists in an unnatural
alliance. The failure of the EOC was due partially to the
lessening of tension which followed the death of Stalin in







acceptance of a policy of "coexistence." Equally a factor
were the French commitments in Asia and Algeria which were
heavily draining French resources, men, and material. There
was, in addition, the factor of the general political divi-
sion that existed in France on matters of foreign policy and
which expressed itself in the sine die vote on the EDC.
After 1954, the Fourth Republic dissolved itself in
the acid of immobllisme . From 1954 to 1958, the main goal
of French foreign policy was to compensate for the nation's
internal weaknesses. The mainspring of its policy remained
the insistence of its status as a Great Power with "all the
2
attributes and prerequisites pertaining thereto," The
United States position, which was to maintain exclusive
nuclear monopoly within the Atlantic alliance and prevent the
proliferation of nuclear arms, made the Government of the
Fourth Republic realize that it would have to back up
France's diplomatic ventures with nuclear weapons whose con-
trol was solely in the hands of the French, Thus, the
French drive for a nuclear "voice" was begun under the
Fourth Republic's initiative, and it was this "start" which
de Gaulle became heir to in 1958.
What is most readily apparent here is that there has
been a definite continuity in French foreign policy in the
2 bid,, p, 246,





transition from the Fourth to the Pifth French Republics,
While there have been changes in personnel, institutions,
and leadership, the foreign policy goals of close coopera-
tion with West Germany, the acquisition of an independent
nuclear capability, and a greater representation and voice
in the policies of NATO are basically unchanged*
The Suez crisis of 1956, in which the French shared
the onus with Great Britain, almost resulted in the collapse
of the alliance. In this operation, France clearly demon-
strated that her interests superseded her concern for the
alliance* Indeed, the alliance was for France a great dis-
appointment in that the "special relationship, " which had
grown up between Britain and the United States and was very
predominant in the NATO structure, refused to recognize
France's global commitments and thus give her an adequate
voice in NATO policy direction* France, in her Suez venture,
sought to ease Britain away from the United States by bringing
her into closer association with France* Furthermore, she
hoped to build up the waning prestige of her battered armed
forces which had met with little but reversals since Indo-
china. The subsequent failure of the French and British
gamble in Egypt was marked by the British rush to repair
their "special-relationship" with the United States, the re-
sult of which left France in a worse position than before in






alliance while the British and American relationship grew
ever more secure* French policy seemed, after this opera-
tion, to be concentrated upon delaying as long as possible
her decline which seemed impending. Thus, France was forced
to rely upon NATO for her security during this period of
political immobilisrae for she quickly discovered that neu-
tralism was no longer possible and an agreement with the
Soviet Union was out of the question especially after the
successful beginning of the rapprochement with the Govern-
ment of the Federal German Republic.
As previously stated, de Gaulle's Atlantic policies
cannot be divorced from his European policies. He sees for
France the dominant role in the "new" Europe, which he hopes
will develop along the lines of confederation rather than
political federation. Whether the present European movement
has traveled too far along federal lines for de Gaulle to be
able to turn it back or reshape in the image he desires,
only time will tell. The Europe of tomorrow, organized
along French lines, will become the political, economic, and
military balance between the East and the West. It will, in
fact, become the mediator, the "third force," which de
Gaulle truly believes is France* s rightful heritage. This
future role for France is a long-range program which de
Gaulle has no real hope of completing in his allotted life





and leadership in the "new" Europe and to get her started
along the road to pre-eminence in the "third force" which
will eventually and naturally emerge, so that nothing can
stop the course of events. In 1961, de Gaulle summed up his
program
:
We shall do what we have to do, we shall help to
build up Europe, which, by confederating its nations
can and must - for the sake of mankind - become the
greatest potential economic, military, and cultural
power that has ever existed. We shall help this
assembled Europe and its daughter America to re-
organize their alliance to better defend the free
world and to act together in all parts of the
earth.
3
France *s nuclear program has been termed by the
United States divisive, inimical to the Western alliance,
based upon distrust of America's good intentions, and prone
to obsolescence. The United States has shown little under-
standing of the political and psychological motives behind
the European independent nuclear programs.
The American desire to defend the Atlantic Area by
centralized control of the West's nuclear forces and policy
direction, presents our allies with a dilemma. Few in
Europe are in agreement with the United States on the feasi-
bility of a purely conventional force. Additionally, they
want a larger share in determining their fate within alliance
policies.
3Edgar S. Furniss, Jr., "DeGaulle's France and NATO:




The most recent use of the West's deterrent threat,
in the Cuban Crisis, taught the Europeans two valuable les-
sons* Europe, without nuclear forces of its own, faced the
threat of becoming involved in a nuclear war without being
consulted* Further, the settlement of the issues at stake
was achieved by the two Great Nuclear Powers. The country
most concerned, Cuba, which possessed only conventional
weapons of its own, did not have a voice in the negotiations,
The parallel for the Europeans was too obvious not to be
understood*
The incentive for nuclear weapons, on a national
basis, cannot be explained or assessed solely in terms of
their military value. Even a small nuclear force can be
effective for the purposes of bargaining, if only on a
limited scale. In this connection, it is interesting to
compare the U.S. and European views of de Gaulle *s goals and
his methods of achieving them. In the United States, his
"intransigent" attitude is condemned, and there is a tend-
ency to blame all his actions upon his folie de grandeur .
While it would be a mistake to overlook the fact that to
de Gaulle, national prestige is important, his entire policy
is not based upon this or his stubborn pride. As Walter
Lippmann observed, the contest which de Gaulle is waging is
"power politics played by the master of the game."
Many observers in the United States continue to
;t»a &





regard France *s Force de Frappe simply in military terms and
gloss over its political implications. In Europe, however,
it is almost universally accepted that this French force is
motivated more by political than military considerations.
As the United States has found out, we are not going to make
much headway with de Gaulle by continually emphasizing the
negligible value which this force has in comparison to our
nuclear contribution to the West's deterrent, or by pointing
out that it serves only to muddle up American strategy for
Europe's defense.
The allies and the French have another incentive in
developing their nuclear forces. They see such a force as
not only an aid to bargaining with the U.S.S.R. but also as
a means to gain greater influence over American actions.
The French see, in accepting the American thesis on
independent nuclear forces, a surrender of their program
which would be tantamount to resigning forever from the de-
fense of her own security. It would mean, in their eyes,
the abandonment of Europe's defense to the promises of not
just one American President, as de Gaulle stated in rebuttal
to President Kennedy's speech in Berlin in 1963, but to all
future Presidents. Such a dependency would transform Europe
into a satellite of the United States instead of a partner.
One of two things are likely to happen in the current





necessity of coordinating their forces with ours or they
will assume a larger, major burden of their own defense
which, in the conventional field, is what the United States
would like to see happen.
In the area of sharing any nuclear command within
NATO with the Europeans, the United States will have to
prove that it is willing to go a lot farther in this direc-
tion than it has in the past if it ever hopes to have the
Europeans abandon their plans for independent forces. As
yet, the United States has not advanced any concrete pro-
posals for a multi-national or multilateral force concept
which will meet the requirements of the Europeans*
Had United States policies in the past been more
realistic and had they taken into consideration the very
real fears, criticisms and objections expressed by the
Europeans, the present difficulty might have been avoided.
Instead, we chose to brush aside our allies' criticisms
whether they were valid or not, and we dismissed as irrele-
vant their arguments in regard to our nuclear and conven-
tional defense policies for the alliance.
Europe has now found itself and insists that it be
heard. While some European concepts may not be technically
feasible, they, at least, merit the consideration of being
evaluated in terms of the "new" Europe and not against the
Europe of 1949. If it can, at long last, be recognized that
--.
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a change has occurred and give it an opportunity to have its
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